1913 papers on atomic constitution · 1928 The Quantum Postulate · 1935 reply to EPR · 1949 discussion with Einstein
Chinese content v1.3|method version v1.3|2026-10-24
Front-Page Identification
- Number
- No.61
- Figure
- Bohr|Niels Henrik David Bohr (1885—1962)
- Tradition
- Quantum physics / complementarity and the foundations of quantum theory
- Main texts
- “On the Constitution of Atoms and Molecules” (1913); “The Quantum Postulate and the Recent Development of Atomic Theory” (1928); “Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality be Considered Complete?” (1935); “Discussion with Einstein on Epistemological Problems in Atomic Physics” (1949)
- Core original-text marks
- “difficulties of a serious nature” (1913, introduction of the original publication; S1, original English checked) “the principles underlying the description of atomic phenomena” (1928, abstract of the original publication; S2, English checked) “a certain ‘criterion of physical reality’ ... contains an essential ambiguity” (1935, abstract of the original APS publication; S3)
- Final six-position placement
- ④ Explaining the world (B); ③ Questioning the ground as an important competing direction (C); ① is a D-level stress test
- Archive status
- Chinese content v1.3|method version v1.3|2026-10-24
Archival statement: the evidence of this archive rests on the listed texts of the author and formal text databases; each card states clearly the range of verified text and of missing evidence awaiting checking. Judgement grades express the strength of interpretation and do not replace the original.
1. Person Overview
One-line placement: ④ Explaining the world (B); ③ Questioning the ground as an important competing direction (C); ① is a D-level stress test. Starting from the stability of the atom and the regularities of spectra, he gradually made the quantum postulate, the experimental arrangement and the boundaries of classical description into a necessary structure of physical explanation; measurement is not a consciousness that independently creates reality.
Most distinctive point: “complementarity” is not a casual claim that both sides of a contradiction are right; it lays down, for mutually exclusive yet separately necessary experimental arrangements and their classical descriptions, what kinds of physical statement can be made.
Final load-bearing point: the quantum postulate, the non-negligibility of experimental conditions, observational set-ups that cannot be combined simultaneously, records in classical language, and publicly communicable predictions and evidence bear the load together.
Most subtle point: if an experimental situation cannot be deleted from the definition of a phenomenon, does this mean ① has built observation and utterance into the whole? The answer is limited to the domain of physical measurement; one cannot pass directly from “the phenomenon includes the conditions of measurement” to ultimate occurrence itself.
2. Reading Notes|Levels of Evidence and Judgement
This archive strictly distinguishes the reliability of the text (T1—T4) from the strength of structural judgement (A—D). T1 = the author’s own core papers / works or early core texts of strong attribution; T2 = reliably confirmed material whose genre, co-authorship, transmission or attribution needs further definition; T3 = texts whose edition, attribution or representativeness is substantively disputed; T4 = later commentary, research and extension in tradition, serving only as background and not passed off as the author’s own words. Differences among figures must be marked clearly in each card.
A = a textual fact stated directly by the original; B = a strong structural inference supported by several reliable original passages; C = grounded in the original, but with an equally reasonable alternative reading;
D = a counter-pressure test / a hypothesis awaiting verification. A textual fact reaching A does not automatically raise a philosophical interpretation to A. The so-called “original language checked”, “English translation checked” and “evidence missing, awaiting checking” are an independent verification status, not definitions of A—D.
Direction of evidence: supporting = supports the present six-position placement; limiting = shows a non-deletable relation or boundary; disputed = the original allows grounded different structural interpretations; neutral = does not form a core limit in the deletion test. ① must prove at once that cognition, utterance and understanding are positively included in a more basic structure, and that the complete structure still holds once “right cognition of the ground” is deleted; local reflexivity is not complete self-inclusion.
Unified standard for verification and inference: T1 marks the status of a text directly attributed to the author’s core works, which is a separate axis from whether the item has had its original language checked, has a reliable translation, or has only a chapter location; an unchecked original language is not automatically lowered to T2. A proves only the textual fact of a checked short phrase; unchecked content may not be claimed as an A-level verbatim quotation. B is a strong structural inference formed by several mutually constraining links across reliable texts or within the same core argument, with no mechanical numerical threshold;
checking a reliable English translation can form B, but where there is only an abstract, only the claims the abstract states explicitly may be used for stronger judgements, and technical steps beyond the abstract may not be claimed as checked in full text; checking only a bibliography or later exposition does not alone bear a B-level main conclusion. An independent C-type competition can be triggered by local B evidence, because the strength of the six positions concerns the main task of the thought as a whole rather than the strength of a single card.
3. Textual Scope and Method
Main texts: “On the Constitution of Atoms and Molecules” (1913); “The Quantum Postulate and the Recent Development of Atomic Theory” (1928); “Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality be Considered Complete?” (1935); “Discussion with Einstein on Epistemological Problems in Atomic Physics” (1949)
Sources and scope of verification: the core material is the original 1913 English paper, the complete English text of the 1928 Nature paper (S6), the checkable original abstract and some excerpts of the 1935 Physical Review paper, and the bibliographic record of the 1949 retrospective; the later popular “quantum consciousness” view is not poured back as Bohr’s own claim.
Methodological boundary: the structural argument is built only from the author’s texts, distinguishing what the author said, reasonable structural inference and later interpretation; the “theoretical confirmation” of a scientific result is not mechanically the same as ②’s “the ground is rightly recognized”; nor does the narrative entrance automatically decide the final six positions.
Refinement of verification: E-01—E-03 from the original 1913 English paper can bear a B-level structural chain of stationary states and spectra; the complete English text of the 1928 “Quantum Postulate” can now be checked section by section in S6, where §1 directly states the quantum postulate, the interaction with the experimental apparatus and the complementarity of causal and space-time description, and the end discusses the connection of language with ordinary perception (E-05—E-07). For the 1935 Physical Review paper, what is reliably checked at present is the abstract, the visible excerpts and the direction of part of the text; the details of the body described in E-09—E-10 have not all been checked paragraph by paragraph, and the abstract may not be used to infer that the full text has been read through.
4. Core Question and Structure of Thought
Core research question: when quantum phenomena must be fully described together with the experimental arrangement, is what is needed an independent completion of right cognition of the ground, or a structure of physical explanation limited by experimental conditions yet publicly communicable?
1. From the classical difficulty of the instability of Rutherford’s nuclear atom, he introduces a quantum restriction (E-01).
2. He explains the hydrogen spectrum by stationary states and by the energy of transitions and the frequency of radiation (E-02, E-03).
3. He uses the limiting behaviour of classical description and the correspondence principle to connect the old theory and the new (E-04).
4. The quantum postulate makes it impossible to treat the action of measurement as an infinitesimally negligible quantity (E-05).
5. Space-time description and causal–momentum description become complementary in concrete experimental situations (E-06, E-07).
6. The debate with EPR returns the criterion of physical reality to experimental conditions; public language and evidence are both necessary and bounded (E-08—E-12).
5. Original-Text Evidence Base
Each E card below states separately the text level, the specific scope of verification, the gist of the text, its role in the six-position judgement, the overreaching readings that cannot be inferred, and the source. A checked short phrase indicates only the textual fact of the quotation; the certainty of interpretation is given separately by B / C / D. Direction terms are defined in Chapter 2; sentences not compared item by item are not passed off as quotations in the original language.
Gist of the original (this archive’s restatement, not a verbatim quotation): The author adopts the atomic picture of nucleus and electrons, while explaining that under classical electrodynamics stable electron orbits are hard to maintain.
Structural role here: Supporting|the clear starting point of ④: research undertaken to resolve physical contradictions in observable atomic structure and spectra.
What it does not prove: Classical instability cannot be equated directly with all the problems of quantum theory having been solved.
E-02|1913 Part I §1—2|the hypothesis of stationary states
Gist of the original (this archive’s restatement, not a verbatim quotation): Certain atomic states are taken as special stable states that do not radiate continuously, and quantum relations are used to explain the energy differences between states and radiation.
Structural role here: Supporting|delete stationary states and the relation of transitions, and the explanation of the discrete spectrum of the hydrogen atom cannot be established by this argument from principle (structural layer).
What it does not prove: This model of stationary orbits is an early model and cannot be equated directly with modern quantum mechanics.
E-03|1913 Part I §3|connection with the hydrogen spectrum
Gist of the original (this archive’s restatement, not a verbatim quotation): The transition frequencies are compared with the empirical formula of the hydrogen spectrum, and the limits of applicability of classical laws are discussed.
Structural role here: Supporting|shows that the model bears a testable quantitative explanation and is not epistemological propaganda about consciousness.
What it does not prove: Early agreement with experience does not guarantee that the explanation of all many-electron atoms is complete.
E-04|1913 Part II|extension to many-electron atoms
Gist of the original (this archive’s restatement, not a verbatim quotation): An attempt to extend the quantum atomic framework to systems with more than one electron.
Structural role here: Neutral|shows the breadth of ④’s explanation of the empirical world and the tentative limits of the original theory.
What it does not prove: It cannot be claimed on this basis that the later orbital concept of quantum mechanics remained the author’s final ontology.
E-05|1928 “Quantum Postulate”, opening|experimental disturbance is not negligible
Gist of the original (this archive’s restatement, not a verbatim quotation): The quantum postulate changes the assumption that atomic phenomena can be analysed continuously; the interaction between the experimental arrangement and the quantum object cannot always be treated as an arbitrarily small disturbance.
Structural role here: Disputed|a ③ question does appear: what is a complete physical phenomenon, and when can concepts be given definite meaning?
What it does not prove: This does not mean that consciousness instantly produces particles, nor can “disturbance” be simply mapped back onto classical instrument noise.
E-06|1928|the complementarity of space-time description and causal description
Gist of the original (this archive’s restatement, not a verbatim quotation): The author calls space-time localization and the demand of causality / determination of state in the usual sense complementary but mutually exclusive features of description; the ground is that the quantum of action makes the interaction between observation and object non-negligible, so that the unambiguous definition of energy and momentum and the space-time picture limit each other.
Structural role here: Disputed|complementarity is a structure of the possibilities of description, not a universal maxim that thought should accept any two opposed opinions.
What it does not prove: It cannot be inferred from the complementarity of different measurements that the world has no laws at all.
E-07|1928|the continuing necessity of classical concepts
Gist of the original (this archive’s restatement, not a verbatim quotation): In §1 the author points out that the interpretation of experimental material still rests essentially on the concepts of classical physics; at the end he discusses the connection of the words of language with everyday perception. Classical concepts and expressions are not declared invalid as a whole; their usable range must be limited under the conditions of the quantum of action.
Structural role here: Limiting|part of the final load-bearing point is the condition of public description, not an ultimate private onlooker who cannot enter the structure.
What it does not prove: The necessity of classical language does not mean that classical theory fully holds in the microscopic domain.
E-08|1935 “Can Quantum-Mechanical Description … be Considered Complete?”, abstract|ambiguity of the criterion of reality
Verified short phrase in the original (abstract of the original English publication): contains an essential ambiguity when it is applied to quantum phenomena
Gist of the original (this archive’s restatement, not a verbatim quotation): Bohr points out that the “physical reality” criterion proposed by EPR has a key ambiguity when applied to quantum phenomena.
Structural role here: Disputed|③’s meta-question takes shape in a scientific controversy: the completeness of quantum description must be judged together with its conditions.
What it does not prove: It does not assert that the universe appears only in human consciousness; the reply addresses a strictly posed quantum problem.
E-09|1935 paper, body|non-disturbance and experimental conditions
Gist of the original (this archive’s restatement, not a verbatim quotation): Discusses whether “not disturbing another system” can serve as a criterion for presuming that experimental conditions do not take part in the definiteness of physical quantities.
Structural role here: Limiting|the built-in place of cognition and the arrangement of instruments has a precise meaning in scientific explanation; it is not the proof of self-inclusion of all existence that ① requires.
What it does not prove: The reply cannot be summarized as “subjective consciousness changes a distant particle”; this is not a claim of the original paper.
E-10|1935 paper, conclusion|completeness within the range of description
Gist of the original (this archive’s restatement, not a verbatim quotation): From the standpoint of complementarity, it explains that the description of quantum mechanics meets the rational demand of completeness within its range of application.
Structural role here: Supporting|defines the author’s claim as completeness of description within the range of the theory, not that all questions of existence have been ended.
What it does not prove: From the author’s holding the framework of the time to be complete, it cannot be inferred that any later rewriting is logically impossible.
E-11|1949 “Discussion with Einstein …”|epistemological retrospective
Gist of the original (this archive’s restatement, not a verbatim quotation): Looks back on the debate with Einstein about observation, explanation and the completeness of quantum theory, distinguishing the views of reality each was concerned with.
Structural role here: Neutral|puts the reply of the single 1935 paper back into the author’s complete line of thought, and also indicates that terminology may change between stages.
What it does not prove: Historical recollection cannot replace the original arguments of 1913 and 1928, still less can circulating famous sayings from the conversations replace the texts.
E-12|Complementarity and the correspondence principle|limits of the domain of physical concepts
Gist of the original (this archive’s restatement, not a verbatim quotation): From the stationary-state spectral model to the expression of complementarity, the author continually asks under what conditions concepts can be used to make physical assertions.
Structural role here: Disputed|shows that ③ as an important competing direction is a continuous research task, not merely a late remark.
What it does not prove: Cross-text coherence is a structural inference of this archive; it may not be claimed that 1913 already had the complete theory of complementarity of 1935.
6. Key Terms
kvantepostulat/quantum postulate|Quantum postulate: the basic limitation that the quantum of action cannot be neglected.
stationary state|Stationary state: a special stable state in the early atomic theory of 1913.
correspondence principle|Correspondence principle: keeps the relation with classical description in the appropriate limit.
complementarity|Complementarity: descriptions under different experimental arrangements that cannot be combined yet are each necessary.
phenomenon|Phenomenon: a physical object that must be understood together with experimental conditions that can be unambiguously recorded.
classical concepts|Classical concepts: the linguistic resources on which the public expression of measurement results still depends.
physical reality|Physical reality: the criterion term tested in the debate with EPR.
7. The Place of the Ground
Positive evidence: the “ground” is first how quantum phenomena are meaningfully described by theory and tested by experiment; 1913 starts from the stability of the atom, and 1935 discusses the criterion of reality (E-01, E-08).
Limiting evidence: complementarity is not an ontology of the universe as a whole, nor a practice for the highest completion of thought.
Disputed reading: the ③ reading values the boundary between conceptual possibility and reality; the ④ reading stresses that models, apparatus and experimental explanation were the author’s lifelong continuing work.
Most secure present conclusion: ④ explaining the world (B) is primary; ③’s questioning of the grounds of physical knowledge is C competition.
Finer division of ③ / ④: the 1928 complementarity’s “how phenomena come to be described” does touch ③-type conceptual presuppositions, but Bohr in a physical context uses it to limit which experimental conditions can give definite meaning to which quantities, dealing with concrete usable principles for the explanation of quantum phenomena (④ primary). Local ③ reflection can be B-level evidence, but does not prove that the main task as a whole concludes in endless questioning of the ground;
so ③’s competition for the main class is C.
8. Structural End and Final Load-Bearing Point|Strict Deletion Test
Already withdrawn / de-substantialized: the idea that the stable nuclear atom can be explained directly by unmodified classical laws of radiation, and the assignment of a complete classical orbital picture to every quantum process at once (E-01, E-05).
Core structural load-bearing points: the 1913 relation of stationary states—transitions and experimental spectra; in the mature stage, the quantum postulate, complementary experimental set-ups and public classical description (E-02, E-05—E-10).
Disputed functional load-bearing point: the experimental arrangement is a necessary condition for describing phenomena, but that does not mean that a particular observer must have right cognition for physical phenomena to be completed.
Nature of the load-bearing points: a functional relation among instrumental conditions—conceptual licence—testable statements; neither the reification of microscopic objects nor arbitrary subjective creation.
What still holds after deletion: delete the specific make of an instrument, an individual example or an explanatory metaphor, and complementarity and the quantum postulate can still hold (teaching layer).
Where it breaks after deletion: delete the 1913 stationary states: the chain of spectral explanation breaks; delete the qualification by experimental conditions in the mature theory: the 1935 reply on the ambiguity of EPR’s “no disturbance” criterion cannot stand.
Layer of break: stationary states and complementarity are at the theoretical structural layer; concrete experimental practice is at the layer of empirical path and theoretical testing, not a religious kind of final cognition.
Place in the complete ultimate structure: a mature theoretical position on the boundaries of physical description, not a definition of completion as “who finally awakened to the universe”.
Mode of existence after completion: the question of post-awakening existence does not apply; the validity of physical concepts remains tied to concrete experimental domains.
The place of thought itself (reflexivity / self-inclusion): scientific utterance and experimental records are positively placed among the defining conditions of physical phenomena, a strong local self-inclusion;
a whole cross-domain self-inclusion has not been proved.
Return: complementarity is not a withdrawal from the empirical world, but guidance on how to communicate results correctly and limit inferences in different experiments.
Another reasonable reading: ③ can stress reflection on “how reality becomes something sayable”, but it cannot pass beyond the experimental context and be rewritten as metaphysics.
Most secure present boundary: ④ (B); ③ (C); ① has no complete double proof (D).
Judgement grade: the early model and the task of the 1935 controversy are B; pushing from experimental self-inclusion to ultimate self-inclusion is D.
Specific grounds for deletion: the 1913 original introduction first points out the difficulty of the instability of the electron system of the nuclear atom under classical electrodynamics, then introduces a quantum condition and connects the energy difference of stationary states to the frequency of radiation; delete stationary states or transitions, and 1913 Part I §1—3 cannot obtain the relation of the hydrogen spectrum predicted by the original model (structural layer, E-01—E-03).
1928 §1 states explicitly that the observation of quantum phenomena involves a non-negligible interaction with the apparatus, and on this basis limits the definition of states, the space-time picture and causal demands; delete these conditions, and complementarity as a limiting principle of physical description loses the basis of its original argument (structural layer, E-05—E-07). The 1935 abstract also states explicitly that the EPR criterion of reality has a key ambiguity, but all the detailed steps of its body still keep an unchecked boundary (E-08—E-10).
9. The Place of Thought Itself|Reflexivity and Self-Inclusion
Reflexivity: reflecting on whether classical theory wrongly regarded experimental conditions and space-time description as unconditionally transparent constitutes methodological reflexivity (E-05, E-08).
Positive evidence of self-inclusion: experimental arrangements, instrument records and concepts of communication enter positively into the author’s definition of phenomena; this is a local yet substantive self-inclusion.
Cognitive deletion test: delete the independent conscious function of “finally knowing the quantum ground rightly”, and the occurrence of physical experiments does not thereby stop; but to form a public description in quantum theory, experimental conditions and records cannot be deleted.
Most secure present judgement: ① cannot be inferred directly from local scientific self-inclusion as satisfying both conditions across all existence and thought itself; it remains a D stress test.
Comparing the two conditions of ①: the first condition does not hold automatically because “the subject is studied by science” or “grammar enters a formal system”; cognition, the utterance of thought itself and its being understood must have a positive place in a more basic whole structure; partial inclusion within a domain should be acknowledged as it is, but it is not the passing of the whole first condition. The second condition tests whether the final structure laid down by the author still remains complete once “right cognition of the ground” is deleted; for those whose main task is ③ / ④, it serves only to clarify misreadings, and scientific testing or formal proof is not forcibly renamed ②-type realization. The first condition holds only partly: the theoretical statements of 1913, the context of measurement in 1928 and the 1935 reply on completeness all place experimental records and conditions of communication inside “how physical phenomena are explained”;
this is a grounded local self-inclusion, but it does not exhaust consciousness, language itself and all existence. The second condition, as regards the occurrence of physical events, can delete the requirement that “a person rightly recognizes the universe”, but public theoretical statements must still be constrained by communicable classical language and conditions of measurement; neither is the final awakening defined by ②. Therefore ① overall is only D.
10. The Most Subtle Point in This Figure
Positive evidence: “what we can speak of” is for Bohr not mere linguistics, but a question of physics constrained by the quantum postulate and the conditions of the instruments (E-05—E-09).
Limiting evidence: “the conditions of observation cannot be neglected” does not mean “subjective consciousness creates objective things”; nor that “physical facts are all language”.
Disputed reading: if the question of defining phenomena is understood as fundamental questioning, ③ has good reason; if judged by the theoretical products of the original papers and the debates on spectra and experiments, ④ is more solid.
Most secure present conclusion: ④ (B) is the present placement;
③ (C) is kept, and ① serves only as a strict boundary test.
Ruling on the assignment of complementarity: it has both ③’s questioning of conditions and ④’s function of physical explanation; when used to deal with what complementary evidence can be obtained under different experimental arrangements, it is a concrete theoretical principle of ④. Only when it goes on from this limitation to ask “how is knowledge possible” does ③’s competition unfold; neither ③ nor ④ is given exclusive possession of the term.
11. Six-Position Placement
④: the atomic structure and spectra of 1913, the quantum postulate of 1928 and the reply to EPR in 1935 all build testable explanations for physical phenomena (B).
③: the completeness of description and the relation between experiment and reality are continually discussed, but do not replace the aim of physical explanation (C).
②: there is no structure in which an independent ground must be “seen rightly” by some final knower to be completed.
①: the self-inclusion of experimental records is a local, within-domain relation, lacking ultimate total self-inclusion and a complete deletion proof (D).
Final placement: ④ Explaining the world (B); ③ Questioning the ground as an important competing direction (C); ① is a D-level stress test
③’s C comes from the main task as a whole still being the testable explanation of atomic structure and quantum description, not from all E cards being lowered to C. ④ B is supported across periods by the body of the 1913 original (E-01—E-03) and the checked completeness abstract of 1935 (E-08, E-10); the parts of 1928 for which only the abstract was checked and the unchecked body are not used as the sole strong pillar.
12. Highest Achievement
He firmly bound what can be said in quantum theory to experimental conditions, recordable results and public physical language, while avoiding forcing complementary phenomena into a single classical picture.
13. Strongest Objections and Replies
R-01|Complementarity means “both sides of everything are true”
Strongest counter-reading: Since things are complementary, any contradictory claims can coexist.
Adjudicated reply: For the author complementarity depends on concrete mutually exclusive experimental arrangements and the conditions under which phenomena can be described; it cannot be expanded into a fudge unconstrained by evidence.
R-02|Observation affects phenomena, so ② holds
Strongest counter-reading: Delete the observer’s right consciousness, and the quantum world cannot be completed.
Adjudicated reply: The author requires experimental arrangements and communicable conditions of measurement; he does not prove that the subject’s right cognition is a condition of the universe’s completion.
R-03|Utterance being included in experiment already proves ①
Strongest counter-reading: Scientific argument includes the observations that record itself, so both conditions of ① are passed at once.
Adjudicated reply: The conditions of phenomena within a domain are not the structure of the occurrence of all existence; nor can the second condition replace the test of the relation of completion of thought with “remove humans and there is still a universe”.
R-04|1935 is only epistemology, so ③ is the main class
Strongest counter-reading: The completeness debate touches how knowledge is possible; quantum physics is only an example.
Adjudicated reply: The stationary-state spectra of 1913 and the quantum postulate of 1928 have independent tasks of physical explanation; philosophical reflection serves them.
R-05|The necessity of classical language is conservative classical realism
Strongest counter-reading: Bohr still speaks classical language, so in essence he has not left classical physics.
Adjudicated reply: Having to use classical language to record experimental results does not mean that classical orbits and the classical causal picture are valid in all microscopic situations.
R-06|The 1913 atomic model is outdated and cannot count as the main line
Strongest counter-reading: The early picture was changed by later quantum mechanics, so it should not enter the placement of the figure.
Adjudicated reply: Placement looks at the continuity of the task of thought, not at whether a model is still used formula by formula today; the author always worked around the physical explanation of atomic phenomena.
14. Comparison with Neighbours
Compared with Einstein (No.60, comparative hypothesis awaiting verification), both insist on serious physical description, but disagree on the completeness of the wave function and the criterion of reality; compared with Gödel (No.62, comparative hypothesis awaiting verification), the situational limits of quantum description are not a theorem of undecidability in formal systems; compared with Newton (No.68, comparative hypothesis awaiting verification), the domain of application of classical laws is not wholly erased by quantum theory.
15. Final Summary
Summary: Bohr’s complementarity takes the conditions of measurement and public description into the explanation of quantum phenomena, but does not establish consciousness as the ground of the world’s occurrence, nor propose a complete ultimate self-inclusion beyond physical theory; the main task is ④ explaining the world.
Final placement: ④ Explaining the world (B); ③ Questioning the ground as an important competing direction (C); ① is a D-level stress test
Scope limits: the degree of verification of the evidence is listed card by card;
where there are reasonable alternative interpretations it is kept at C; originals not yet verified are not used as direct quotations.
16. Sources and Edition Notes
Source 01|S1|N. Bohr 1913, On the Constitution of Atoms and Molecules, English transcription of the original publication: https://www.gutenberg.org/files/72787/72787-h/72787-h.htm
Source 02|S2|N. Bohr 1928, The Quantum Postulate and the Recent Development of Atomic Theory, abstract and bibliographic information of the original Nature publication: https://www.nature.com/articles/121580a0
Source 03|S3|N. Bohr 1935, Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality be Considered Complete?, APS: https://journals.aps.org/pr/abstract/10.1103/PhysRev.48.696
Source 04|S4|Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Bohr’s Correspondence Principle, bibliography of the original works and background of the argument: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bohr-correspondence/
Source 05|S5|Bibliography of Bohr’s 1949 retrospective paper (discussion with Einstein on epistemological problems), in Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-copenhagen/
Source 06|S6|Full English text of Bohr’s 1928 “Quantum Postulate” (transcribed from Nature 121:580—590; §1—2 and conclusion checked): https://www.gutenberg.org/files/72800/72800-h/72800-h.htm
Source 07|S7|CERN record of the bibliography and full-text access for the original 1935 paper: https://cds.cern.ch/record/1060284
Note on the text version: where quotations involve English translation, they are understood according to the translation noted in the card and not passed off as the original language; this archive does not treat later modern research as the author’s own text; the present limits of verification are stated item by item within the cards.