The World as Will and Representation, vols. I–II · On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason
The World as Will and Representation, vols. I–II · On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason
Chinese content v1.3｜method version v1.3｜2026-10-23
Sources of the front-page marks: Die Welt ist meine Vorstellung. (The World as Will and Representation, vol. I §1); Was nach gänzlicher Aufhebung des Willens übrig bleibt (same work, vol. I §71, where the text goes on to speak of “nothing” from the standpoint of one who still affirms the will). Both are traceable original marks, and isolated sentences do not replace structural evidence.
One-line placement: Schopenhauer takes blind will as the ground of the world, not waiting on cognition, but the denial of the will in the sense of liberation is not without need of knowledge. The German of §68 states clearly that the difference between the so-called “two paths” is whether suffering is first seen through, or directly experienced suffering calls forth “the same knowledge” (jene Erkenntniß); the author sums up that the denial of the will always arises from knowledge as the quieter of its inner conflict and essential nothingness. Delete abstract philosophical knowledge and the path of direct suffering remains; delete this intuitive cognitive function and the account of completion common to both paths changes. Hence currently ② (B), while that the §71 endpoint cannot be depicted by ordinary subject—object cognition is a C on the mode of being.
Most distinctive point: one might suppose that the second path of §68, the “path of suffering”, can bypass cognition entirely, but the end of the same section says explicitly that suffering calls forth the same knowledge. Knowledge can be a non-abstract, non-theoretical “recognition” without a substantial subject, yet still bears load in the relation of completion of the true denial of the will.
Core question: if the sensible world is only representation for a knower, what is the thing in itself? If its inner essence is endless will, why is suffering universal, and can art, compassion and asceticism end this drive?
This archive distinguishes “textual reliability” from “strength of structural judgment”. T1–T4 describe the date, authorial attribution, stability of transmission or representativeness of the text itself. A–D describe how certain a judgment drawn from the text is: A = stated directly in the original; B = a strong structural inference supported by several passages; C = grounded, but with an equally reasonable alternative reading; D = an objector’s stress test / a hypothesis awaiting verification. An A-grade original only proves that “the text really says this”, and does not automatically raise the related interpretation to A.
Direction marks: support = supports the current six-position judgment; limit = shows a functional mediation still bearing load or a possible boundary; disputed = the text does not point one way; neutral = the text exists but does not for now constitute a core limit in the deletion test.
The evidence cards clearly distinguish “short German original phrase” from “Chinese located paraphrase”, and an unchecked paraphrase may not be put in quotation marks as a verbatim original.
Range of core texts: the main axis is vol. I of the World, §1, §17—23, §25—28, §30—39, §52, §54, §63—71, compared with the author’s supplementary epistemology and theory of asceticism in vol. II. The German follows an online transcription of the 1892 Reclam printing, with section numbers checked against an English translation of the author’s system; the author’s different revised versions of vol. I and modern translations differ in wording, and unchecked passages are given only as located paraphrase. A special distinction is drawn between the philosopher “knowing what the will is” and the ascetic’s “will truly turning”, and the former may not be taken as a sufficient condition of the latter.
T1–T4 for this figure: T1 = the core chapters of vol. I in Schopenhauer’s own works, approved by the author and stable; the author’s own revisions and vol. II are in principle also his direct thought, but editions must be noted separately. T2 = reliable editors’ accounts of their choices among editions;
T3 = unchecked isolated appendices or variant readings; T4 = later Buddhist-tinged, Nietzschean or psychological interpretations. Core cards follow the section numbers of the original work, and others’ summaries are not taken as the author’s direct evidence.
Boundary of quotation and collation: this archive takes the work and the traditional chapter, section or book as its unit of verification; English translations are aids for checking the author’s propositions, not verbatim substitutes for the author’s original German. Where the author’s own statements are listed separately, they should be marked T2 under v1.3 and read against T1; this archive does not use disputed posthumous papers as core evidence.
If the sensible world is only representation for a knower, what is the thing in itself? If its inner essence is endless will, why is suffering universal, and can art, compassion and asceticism end this drive?
1. The most general form of knowledge is the world as representation; subject and object together determine representation, not the thing in itself.
2. The body is given in two ways: as an object in experience, and as experienced inwardly in action as will, which leads to the explanation of “the world as will”.
3. Nature, life and desire are objectifications of the will at different grades; knowledge usually serves desire, and reason is not the founder of the ground.
4. Aesthetic contemplation temporarily frees knowledge from individual desire; music in a special way approaches the will itself, but aesthetic respite is not final salvation.
5. In ethics, compassion breaks through the strict opposition of self and other under the principle of individuation; insight into the suffering of all life may move the denial of the will.
6. The true denial of the will to live is not suicide; suicide may still express a desire dissatisfied with the conditions of life, whereas asceticism and renunciation are a turning of the will.
7. §71 calls the final result “nothing” from the standpoint of one who still affirms the will, while denying that ordinary cognition can positively describe a state beyond subject and object.
Note on evidence (repeated): T1–T4 indicate the reliability of textual sources, A–D the certainty of the card’s textual facts and structural interpretation; A extends only to what is explicitly said. Support, limit, disputed and neutral all refer to the present six-position argument for this figure. The “proposition in the original” on most cards is a Chinese research paraphrase with an exact chapter pointer, not the German original sentence; short original phrases are marked separately with their source.
Proposition or short quotation from the original: German: “Die Welt ist meine Vorstellung.” Everything in the world that can be experienced exists as representation for the subject.
Structural role of this evidence: The fundamental starting point is the cognitive form of the empirical world; subject—object is not a relation added later by chance.
What it does not prove: This is the determination of “the world as representation”, not a claim that the world in itself is a psychological creation.
Proposition or short quotation from the original: The world of representation must appear in subject and object, time and space, and causal relations.
Structural role of this evidence: Cognition and the empirical world obtain a formal structural place; the world is not a ready-made object seen unconditionally.
What it does not prove: The representational forms of cognition cannot directly replace the ontological determination of the will itself.
Proposition or short quotation from the original: The principle of sufficient reason governs only the various relations of appearances, and cannot treat the thing in itself as one of the causes.
Structural role of this evidence: It shows that the forms of empirical explanation have limits, preventing the causal chain from being extrapolated into an ultimate ground.
What it does not prove: It does not show that the passage from the body to the will as thing in itself is free of problems of inference.
Proposition or short quotation from the original: A turn from the external structure of “representation” to the question of what the inner meaning of the world is.
Structural role of this evidence: It establishes the pivot from epistemology to metaphysics; stopping at “the world is representation” cannot fully answer the author’s core question.
What it does not prove: This is still the advance of enquiry, and cannot be regarded as the denial of the will already completed.
Proposition or short quotation from the original: One’s own body is known both as an object in representation and as directly manifesting will; action and act of will are not two things.
Structural role of this evidence: The “twofold givenness of the body” is the main bridge from experience to the will as being.
What it does not prove: Extending from my body to the will of all things is still an extension of the author’s argument, and cannot automatically be regarded as logical proof.
Proposition or short quotation from the original: If other things are seen only as representations while only the self has will, one falls into theoretical solipsism.
Structural role of this evidence: It opposes making the inwardness of the “I” a unique privilege, and begins to extend the will to the world as a whole.
What it does not prove: Avoiding solipsism is not the same as fully proving that all lifeless things really have will of the same nature.
Proposition or short quotation from the original: The will as thing in itself is not limited by the individuation, time and space of representation.
Structural role of this evidence: The ground is blind rather than defined by self-knowledge: the existence of the will does not wait on being rightly recognized.
What it does not prove: That the will is not bound by the forms of individuation does not directly imply that it has no active structure.
Proposition or short quotation from the original: The will in itself is groundless, while actions in appearance are determined by motives and causes.
Structural role of this evidence: It reveals that “groundless” does not mean that appearances are arbitrary or that empirical causality fails.
What it does not prove: “Groundless” may not be mystified into an additional hidden substance.
Proposition or short quotation from the original: The phenomena of nature at all levels can be understood as objectifications of the will in different degrees, with struggle and conflict among individuals.
Structural role of this evidence: The relation of the will to the world of differences is not externally accidental; the competition of life manifests the will itself.
What it does not prove: This overall inference has alternative explanations in modern science and philosophy; historical verification is a separate matter.
Proposition or short quotation from the original: Individuation and the objectification of the will make the will seem to conflict with itself.
Structural role of this evidence: It states that suffering and self-contradiction come from the working of the will, not merely from erroneous moral doctrines.
What it does not prove: The author’s “the will struggling with itself” cannot be taken as a direct sufficient explanation of every social conflict.
Proposition or short quotation from the original: Ordinary knowledge is subservient to desire; aesthetic contemplation temporarily becomes pure knowledge not driven by the will.
Structural role of this evidence: Cognition can temporarily separate from the service of the will and enter an impersonal beholding.
What it does not prove: The pure subject of knowledge during aesthetic experience is still a cognitive function, not proof of an ultimate absence of subject.
Proposition or short quotation from the original: The beautiful and the sublime free the individual from desire for a moment, experiencing a kind of freedom.
Structural role of this evidence: It shows that “not being ruled by individual desire” and “the will as a whole having been thoroughly denied” are not the same.
What it does not prove: Aesthetic release is a temporary state, and cannot replace the endpoint of the theory of asceticism.
Proposition or short quotation from the original: Music, unlike the other arts’ copies of the Ideas, is said to express the will directly in a special way.
Structural role of this evidence: A medium by which art returns to the world of differences, showing that the doctrine of the will is not only suffering and denial.
What it does not prove: Music cannot be taken directly as a sufficient condition for never desiring again after knowing the ground.
Proposition or short quotation from the original: The will itself is blind;
the world of representation becomes the will’s self-knowledge at its various grades; knowledge reaches a higher degree with human beings.
Structural role of this evidence: §54 gives knowledge a positive place as a manifestation of the will (B-grade evidence possible for ①’s first condition), but inclusion itself does not guarantee that the denial of the will remains complete once cognition is deleted from it.
What it does not prove: The will’s “self-knowledge” is not an independent divine person; it cannot be inferred directly from the internalization of knowledge that the condition of completion of asceticism is deletable.
Proposition or short quotation from the original: All desire expresses lack, want or pain, and satisfaction can hardly stop renewed desire.
Structural role of this evidence: It establishes the ontological—vital connection of the author’s pessimistic argument.
What it does not prove: This passage cannot be taken directly as an empirical scientific law without exception for every person’s experience.
Proposition or short quotation from the original: Once the principle of individuation is seen through, justice, compassion and selfless love can have a deeper source.
Structural role of this evidence: From “the suffering of others” into moral transformation; right seeing-through and ethical response are conditionally linked.
What it does not prove: Ethical compassion does not necessarily occur by knowing an abstract doctrine.
Proposition or short quotation from the original: From seeing through the principle of individuation and feeling the suffering of all things, the denial of the will to live may occur.
Structural role of this evidence: It positively establishes the link of completion insight—cessation of the will; it should be read together with the summary at the end of §68, “always arising from the quieter of knowledge”, and is not merely listing an optional path.
What it does not prove: What is needed is intuitive, inward knowledge, not the necessary acceptance of some abstract philosophical doctrine, nor a static cognitive subject persisting after completion.
Proposition or short quotation from the original: §68 states explicitly that the two paths differ thus: one is pure knowledge of suffering after seeing through individuation, the other is directly experienced suffering that “jene Erkenntniß hervorruft” (calls forth that same knowledge); the same section says that the denial of the will “immer aus dem Quietiv ... welches die Erkenntniß ... ist” (always arises from the quieter which is knowledge).
Structural role of this evidence: This clarifies a key ambiguity: suffering can replace theoretical speculation as the way in, but, by what the author explicitly says here, it cannot prove that the final denial of the will no longer needs a cognitive function.
What it does not prove: It cannot be inferred that suffering mechanically and necessarily leads to denial; the author also says explicitly that suffering does not produce denial with causal necessity, nor can the cognitive function be equated with abstract philosophy or a permanently persisting knower.
Proposition or short quotation from the original: Denying the will is not something possessed once and never shaken, but requires struggle against desire that keeps arising again.
Structural role of this evidence: The structure of completion is not a single static “after awakening”; the maintained state involves the tension of body and will.
What it does not prove: It cannot be inferred from this that the ascetic must forever perform a static act of knowing.
Proposition or short quotation from the original: Suicide differs from the denial of the will to live: the suicide may still want life, only denying the conditions he meets.
Structural role of this evidence: It understands “denial” as a turning of the will itself, not the same as the destruction of the body.
What it does not prove: This is only a philosophical interpretation, and should not be used as a moral verdict on people in pain.
Proposition or short quotation from the original: Necessity governs actions at the level of appearance, yet the denial of the will is called the appearance of freedom in the phenomenon.
Structural role of this evidence: It displays the structural difficulty between empirical determinism and fundamental freedom.
What it does not prove: Because the word “freedom” appears, one cannot say that every action can break causality at will.
Proposition or short quotation from the original: After the ultimate denial, it seems empty nothing to those who still affirm the will to live; the positive state exceeds ordinary subject—object knowledge.
Structural role of this evidence: §71 describes the limits on positively speaking of the state after completion, with the significance of self-reflexivity and of de-objectifying the final state; it cannot be used to infer back that the intuitive knowledge serving as the condition of transformation in §68 never occurred.
What it does not prove: That the endpoint does not belong to the ordinary subject—object framework neither proves a persisting substantial knower, nor means that the function of “knowledge as quieter” before completion is deletable.
Proposition or short quotation from the original: The “nothing” that remains differs by standpoint; for those who have denied the will, the everyday world itself can be seen as “nothing”.
Structural role of this evidence: It subjects the highest concept of the thought to a reversal of standpoint, self-reflexive rather than simply substantialized.
What it does not prove: The use of Buddhist, religious or mystical language at the end does not mean the author has established some religious entity.
Vorstellung／representation: the form of the empirical world of subject—object, not the same as arbitrary subjective fantasy.
Wille／will: the blind driving principle of the world in itself, not to be reduced to rational deliberate choice.
Satz vom Grunde／principle of sufficient reason: the principle of conditions and relations at the level of appearance, not governing the will in itself.
principium individuationis／principle of individuation: the separate appearing of different individuals under the conditions of time and space.
Objektivation／objectification: the manifestation of the will at the levels of nature and life.
reines Subjekt des Erkennens／pure subject of knowledge: the mode of knowledge in aesthetic experience temporarily free of individual desire, not automatically without cognitive function.
Mitleid／compassion: the ethical non-egoistic response to others’ suffering.
Verneinung des Willens／denial of the will: denying the fundamental desire for life, not simply death or suicide.
Quietiv／quieter: the calming effect of knowledge on the activity of the will; to be compared with the path of suffering.
Positive evidence: §18—23 explain the ground in itself through the bodily experience of will; §54 explains the place of knowledge in the objectification of the will; the end of §68 establishes that both paths connect with the denial of the will finally through “knowledge as quieter” (E-14, E-17, E-18).
Limiting evidence: blind will does not exist by being known;
§71 limits the objectifying expression of the state after denying the will. Independence at the level of the ground and load at the level of completion may not be conflated.
Disputed reading: the strong ① reading stresses that the ground does not wait on cognition and that the §71 endpoint exceeds subject and object; the ② reading relies on §68’s explicit statement that both paths complete the denial of the will through knowledge as quieter. The former still has a C-grade dispute about the mode of being at the endpoint, but is not as strong as the latter on the condition of completion.
Present safest conclusion: the will as ground does not wait on knowing (B); the denial of the will as ethical salvation must have an intuitive cognitive function (B); the subject—object mode of being after completion is kept separately at C, without automatically opening the main class.
Already withdrawn / de-substantialized: taking the forms of time, space, causality and the individual as the thing in itself; taking the knowing subject alone as the sole substance of the world; confusing suicide with liberation.
Core structural load-bearing points: the will—representation relation, the twofold givenness of the body, the objectification of the will, the principle of individuation and the ethical denial of the will to live.
Disputed functional load-bearing point: the concrete empirical nature of intuitive knowledge and whether an ordinary knower remains after completion are still C; but the condition of completion laid down in §68, “a certain knowledge becomes the quieter”, has B-grade support.
Object of deletion (one at a time): delete the function “knowing the will’s inner conflict / the whole meaning of suffering, and becoming the quieter”; do not delete direct suffering outside theoretical philosophical language, nor limit knowledge to abstract reasoning. As a control test, delete only abstract theoretical knowledge.
What still holds after deletion: the account of blind will, the forms of representation, suffering and the objectification of the will still holds; if only abstract philosophical knowledge is deleted, the path in which suffering calls forth intuitive knowledge can still hold.
Where it breaks after deletion: if even the intuitive knowledge called forth by suffering is deleted, the relation “knowledge becomes the quieter of the will → denial”, which the author himself sums up in §68, is damaged on both paths;
the language of the non-objectified endpoint in §71 cannot make up for this lack.
Levels of break: deleting abstract theoretical learning is at most the path layer; deleting intuitive knowledge as the condition of completion common to both paths is the structural layer (B); the final-layer state described in §71 does not keep the ordinary subject—object form of representation, and whether it contains a continuing act of knowing is separately C.
Status within the complete ultimate structure: cognition is not the precondition of the existence of blind will, but it is the condition of completion in the author’s complete determination of the true denial of the will; “direct suffering” refers to a different way in, not to denying this knowledge.
Mode of being after completion: §71 can no longer be positively described in the ordinary subject—object structure; this differs from claiming that some independent aware substance once existed or exists forever.
The place of thought itself (self-reflexivity / self-inclusion): §1 acknowledges that all written argument is a representational activity of subject—object; §54 further makes knowledge an aspect of the objectification of the will; §71 actively limits the range these cognitions can reach.
Return: music, art, compassion, animals and the life of nature still receive explanation; liberation does not deny that these empirical phenomena once occurred.
Another reasonable reading: ① can stress that after denial there is no longer a substantial seer or an objectifiable final condition; but if it is used to assert that even the intuitive cognition of §68 can be deleted, it conflicts with the explicit text that both paths call forth knowledge.
Present safest boundary / grade of judgment: ② (B), the common cognitive load of the two paths of §68 is B; ①’s first condition of positive inclusion has B-grade support, the second, the deletion test, has not passed. That the §71 endpoint cannot be positively described keeps a local C-grade dispute.
Positive evidence: §1 takes the subject and object of knowledge as forms of representation; §18 takes the philosopher’s own body into will—representation; §54 regards knowledge as the will’s self-knowledge in appearance.
Limiting evidence: the philosopher’s speech about the will still belongs to the structure of representation, and the condition after denial cannot be positively depicted by ordinary objective knowledge; but §68 explicitly lays down the cognitive function for entering that state.
Disputed reading: that §71 cannot positively state the condition after denying the will may be regarded as strict self-reflexivity, or may show that complete “self-speech” has not been actively explained up to the final boundary.
Present safest conclusion: self-inclusion B: §1, §18 and §54 place philosophical language and knowledge within representation / the objectification of the will; self-reflexivity B: §71 limits what can be positively said. Neither cancels the load of intuitive knowledge in §68.
Positive evidence: §68 not only links seeing-through with the denial of the will on one path, but in its summary explicitly sets “pure knowledge of suffering” alongside “suffering calling forth the same knowledge”; both enter denial through knowledge as the quieter of the will.
Limiting evidence: the two paths differ from a single path relying only on abstract philosophy;
suffering does not mechanically and necessarily produce salvation, and the endpoint of §71 cannot be positively explained by the ordinary structure of a knower.
Disputed reading: whether the path of suffering contains knowledge might seem to be judged C; but on reading the German, §68 directly uses “jene Erkenntniß hervorruft” and adds a summary, excluding a purely cognition-free completion as a strong competitor explicitly stated in this section; the remaining dispute concerns the mode of the experience of knowledge and its continuation at the endpoint.
Present safest conclusion: ② (B). Delete the “abstract doctrine” and another path remains; delete the common relation of completion between direct knowledge of suffering and the will and a structural-layer break occurs, so ①’s second condition does not pass.
Current six-position placement: ② Direct Seeing of the Ground (B); ①’s reading of the mode of being at the endpoint is C, and does not open the main-class boundary.
Chain of argument: place of the ground → final load-bearing point → strict deletion test → place of thought itself →
most delicate point, to be read as a whole, not decided by one famous sentence.
Reasons for judgment: Schopenhauer takes blind will as the ground of the world, not waiting on cognition, but the denial of the will in the sense of liberation is not without need of knowledge. The German of §68 states clearly that the difference between the so-called “two paths” is whether suffering is first seen through, or directly experienced suffering calls forth “the same knowledge” (jene Erkenntniß); the author sums up that the denial of the will always arises from knowledge as the quieter of its inner conflict and essential nothingness. Delete abstract philosophical knowledge and the path of direct suffering remains; delete this intuitive cognitive function and the account of completion common to both paths changes. Hence currently ② (B), while that the §71 endpoint cannot be depicted by ordinary subject—object cognition is a C on the mode of being.
Boundary: ②’s load lies in §68’s determination of intuitive knowledge common to both paths, not in the world-will itself needing to be known in order to exist; the removal of subject and object at the §71 endpoint does not change the cognitive function in the complete chain of completion.
Making the empirical form of subject—object, the inner will of the body, the suffering of life, aesthetic release and ethical renunciation into one continuous problem, while acknowledging the limits of philosophical language on reaching the endpoint.
Counter-question: The will is blind and unknowing, and §71 cancels subject and object, so it should be judged ①.
Main grounds: §21, §71.
Current reply: ① can obtain local support from the absence of a substantial knower and the limits on the language of the endpoint, but §68 explicitly ties the denial on both paths to intuitive knowledge as quieter, and the preceding condition of completion cannot be deleted on the strength of §71 alone.
Counter-question: In §68 suffering can lead to denial independently, so it should be judged ① directly.
Main grounds: §68 explicitly has two paths.
Current reply: The objection mis-writes “suffering replaces theoretical knowledge” as “suffering passes through no cognition at all”;
§68 states explicitly that suffering calls forth the same knowledge, so the distinction of routes is accepted, and the inference that it suffices to prove ① is rejected.
Counter-question: Temporary self-forgetting in music / aesthetic experience is already final salvation, with no need for ethical asceticism.
Main grounds: §30—39 and §52.
Current reply: The aesthetic is explicitly described as a temporary release from the will, not the same as the irreversible denial of the will in §68—71; the difference of endpoint should be kept.
Counter-question: In §1 the world is “my representation”, so the whole system is solipsistic and cannot be self-inclusive.
Main grounds: §1; §19.
Current reply: “My” stresses the form of knowledge; §19 actually resists solipsism, extending the body’s will to the whole world, which can be given a positive structural interpretation.
Counter-question: The world is the will’s self-knowledge, showing that the ground must know itself, so it should be judged ② (B) directly.
Main grounds: §54.
Current reply: The knowledge in the objectification of the will in §54 does not independently prove the condition of salvation; the real load-bearing evidence is knowledge becoming the quieter, as explicitly laid down in §68, and the two levels of “self-knowledge” may not be merged into a single proof.
Counter-question: Ethics of compassion is Schopenhauer’s true end, and the denial of the will is only its extreme form, so it should be ④.
Main grounds: The World as Will and Representation vol. I §§63—67 on justice, compassion and selfless love.
Current reply: §§63—66 do ground compassion on seeing through the principle of individuation (E-16), and ethics is a real and important moment; but §§68—71 define the denial of the will as a turn beyond ethical good works, with cognition becoming a quieter as the common condition of both paths (E-17, E-18, E-22). Compassion is the expression and earlier stage of this cognition within ethics, not the end the author lays down; so ④ does not form competition for the main class.
With No.47 Hegel: Hegel’s self-knowledge may be the final determination of the absolute system; Schopenhauer’s will is not ontologically defined by self-knowledge, though the ethical turning may bear load. With No.49 Nietzsche: the latter criticizes the life-value of the denial of the will, and his later judgments cannot be read back into Schopenhauer’s intention.
The will in itself does not have human knowledge of it as a condition of its existence; the world as representation is conditioned by the forms of subject—object. What decides the six-position placement is the complete relation of completion of the denial of the will, not whether blind will exists independently. Vol. I §68 of The World as Will and Representation describes separately the two paths of seeing through suffering and of suffering in one’s own person, but also says explicitly that the latter path calls forth the same knowledge, and makes knowledge the quieter by which the will no longer affirms itself. Deleting abstract philosophical knowledge does not obstruct the path of suffering;
deleting the intuitive cognitive function on which both paths bear load produces a structural-layer break in the relation of denial of the will laid down by the author (B). Hence ② (B); §71’s limits on the subject—object form and sayability after denial keep a local C, without reopening the main class.
This archive maintains: nominalization ≠ substantialization; de-substantialization ≠ deletion of function; whether there is an external knower ≠ the function of right cognition already being deletable; cognition occurring on the path may still bear structural load if it decides complete completion; self-reflexivity ≠ self-inclusion. This archive explains the six-position placement through chains of evidence.
S-01｜World, vol. I, German sections (1892 Reclam printing, table of contents) https://projekt-gutenberg.org/authors/arthur-schopenhauer/books/die-welt-als-wille-und-vorstellung-band-i/chapter/73/
S-02｜World, vol. I, German §1 (accessible from the contents) https://projekt-gutenberg.org/authors/arthur-schopenhauer/books/die-welt-als-wille-und-vorstellung-band-i/chapter/3/
S-03｜World, vol. I, German §68 https://projekt-gutenberg.org/authors/arthur-schopenhauer/books/die-welt-als-wille-und-vorstellung-band-i/chapter/70/
S-04｜World, vol. I, German §71 https://projekt-gutenberg.org/authors/arthur-schopenhauer/books/die-welt-als-wille-und-vorstellung-band-i/chapter/73/
S-05｜World, vol. I, complete English translation (Haldane/Kemp, Project Gutenberg) https://www.gutenberg.org/files/38427/38427-h/38427-h.html
S-06｜World, vol. I, Fourth Book, traceable English text https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_World_as_Will_and_Representation/Fourth_Book
Scope of edition checking: the 1892 Reclam German of the key summarizing passage of §68 has been read, establishing the relation of “jene Erkenntniß” to the “two paths”; word-for-word collation of variants in the first edition, the author’s later revisions and the corresponding chapters of vol. II has not yet been done. The supra-subject—object mode of being at the §71 endpoint is kept at C, and a local dispute is not dragged into a main-class C.