Metaphysics · Physics · De Anima · Nicomachean Ethics · Posterior Analytics; Politics as supporting text
Metaphysics · Physics · De Anima · Nicomachean Ethics · Posterior Analytics; Politics as supporting text
Chinese content v1.3｜method version v1.3｜2026-10-23
Sources of the core marks: ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη τις ἣ θεωρεῖ τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὂν (Metaphysics Γ1, 1003a21); τὸ δὲ ὂν λέγεται μὲν πολλαχῶς (Metaphysics Γ2, 1003a33); νόησις νοήσεως νόησις (Metaphysics Λ9, 1074b34; Greek spelling awaiting final collation). The marks serve only for orientation and cannot replace the evidence cards; anything marked as awaiting collation is not to be treated as a finally collated original text.
One-line placement: Aristotle both explicitly studies “being qua being” and first principles, and builds relatively independent explanatory systems in the natural, biological, ethical and political domains.
The main task cannot be determined merely from the title of first philosophy or the number of works; currently ③ Inquiring into the Ground (C), the ③/④ boundary open. Divine self-thinking and the highest human contemplation bear real functional load, but the two cannot be merged without proof into a ②-type “right recognition of the ground”.
Most distinctive point: Metaphysics Λ determines the highest actuality of god as thinking itself, and Ethics X determines complete human happiness as contemplation; the former is the internal activity of the divine ground, the latter the final determination of the human good. The two are connected, but cannot be directly identified without argument.
Point of entry: the same world contains change, coming to be and concrete individuals, and yet requires arguable first causes, substance and principles of truth: how can change be explained without reducing everything to chance, and how can “being” be accounted for without mistaking it for a single univocal genus embracing all things?
Archive note: this archive organizes its judgments on the basis of the original texts and traceable translations; the C-grade boundaries kept are reasonable disputes with textual grounds, and do not mean that the author’s original text is defective.
This archive distinguishes “textual reliability” from “strength of structural judgment”. T1–T4 refer to the date, authorial attribution, stability of transmission and representativeness of the text itself; A–D refer to the strength of a judgment drawn from the text: A = stated directly in the original; B = a strong structural inference supported by several passages; C = grounded, but with an equally reasonable alternative reading; D = an objector’s stress test / a hypothesis awaiting verification. An A-grade original only proves that “the text really says this”, and does not automatically raise its interpretation to A.
Direction marks: support = supports the current six-position judgment; limit = shows a point of functional load or a structural boundary; disputed = the text does not point one way; neutral = the text exists but does not for now constitute a core limit in the deletion test. Quotation and paraphrase are always distinguished: most E cards in this archive use “location of the proposition in the original / Chinese paraphrase”, not a verbatim transcription of the original within quotation marks.
Range of original texts: this archive gives priority to Metaphysics Γ／Ζ—Θ／Λ, Physics II, De Anima II—III, and Ethics I, VI, X; Posterior Analytics II provides epistemological cross-confirmation. The Metaphysics and Ethics have problems of editorial layers and book organization, and the modern published order is not taken as the author’s one system during his lifetime. The Greek source text is given word for word only in the few sentences that have been verified; the rest is given as a Chinese “located paraphrase” by the chapters of classical translations, and a translation may not pass for the Greek sentence.
T1—T4 for this figure: T1: structurally stable passages in the transmitted core treatises listed above. T2: individual passages with lecture-style arrangement, or whose attribution or wording awaits checking, which must be marked; this archive has as yet no specific E item confirmed as having to be lowered to T2. T3: doubtful or spurious works do not bear load. T4: later commentaries such as those of Alexander of Aphrodisias and Aquinas, limited to the history of comparison.
Boundary of evidence: edition pagination follows each author’s traditional standard references (Aristotle Bekker; Plotinus treatise—chapter; Descartes AT volume and page);
only original wording that has been checked exactly is called an “original sentence”. Modern secondary literature is used to correct the history of interpretation or textual scholarship, and is not poured back into the author’s position.
The same world contains change, coming to be and concrete individuals, and yet requires arguable first causes, substance and principles of truth: how can change be explained without reducing everything to chance, and how can “being” be accounted for without mistaking it for a single univocal genus embracing all things?
1. Starting from experience and wonder: the desire to know drives the study of causes, and wisdom is directed at first principles (Metaphysics Α1–2).
2. In the Physics, the four kinds of cause — matter, form, source of motion and end — are distinguished, explaining the inner motion and coming to be of natural things.
3. In Metaphysics Γ, the study of “being qua being” is proposed, while being is acknowledged to be said in many ways and focused on substance.
4. Through potentiality and actuality, form and matter, the constitution and change of individual substances are explained, and in Λ this is carried forward to an unmoved principle of actuality.
5. The highest unmoved mover moves as what is desired and thought, and its thinking is thinking of itself; but natural explanation and human knowing are not thereby identified with it.
6. Ethical completion consists of virtuous action, practical wisdom and contemplation; the highest contemplation is not a creative premise of the coming to be of the whole world.
To repeat: T1—T4 measure textual reliability, A—D measure the strength of inference; A refers only to what the passage corresponding to the card clearly expresses, and does not make all structural inferences A. Support / limit / disputed / neutral each state the relation to the current six-position judgment. Most “excerpts” are given as Chinese semantic locations, and may not pass for word-for-word transcriptions of the Greek, French or Latin originals; the collation status is noted card by card.
Proposition / phrase in the original: All humans by nature desire to know; the senses, especially sight, are valued.
Structural role of this evidence: It establishes the way into enquiry: seeking knowledge from experience, without directly raising sight into a condition of the highest being.
What it does not prove: The desire to know is not a declaration that “all being depends on human knowing to hold”.
Proposition / phrase in the original: Wisdom is to explain first causes and principles; philosophy begins in wonder.
Structural role of this evidence: The main task of philosophy is not simply to list natural regularities, but to investigate “why” and the first grounds.
What it does not prove: “First cause” alone cannot yet prove that an ultimate experience that can be directly seen has been found.
Proposition / phrase in the original: Causes are to be explained at least as matter, form, source of motion and end.
Structural role of this evidence: The coming to be of the natural world is not attributed to a single material push: a multiple causal framework bears the explanation.
What it does not prove: The four causes are not four substances, nor can they be mechanically applied to every single activity.
Proposition / phrase in the original: Natural things have in themselves a source of motion and rest, distinguishing them from artefacts.
Structural role of this evidence: Natural explanation rests on the principle of motion in the things themselves, and does not depend on someone first seeing it.
What it does not prove: One cannot assert from this that the concept of nature holds entirely in modern science.
Proposition / phrase in the original: Greek original sentence: ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη τις ἣ θεωρεῖ τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὂν.
Structural role of this evidence: It states explicitly that there is a science studying “being qua being”, which directly supports ③: the enquiry into the most general being and the first cause.
What it does not prove: Stating explicitly that being is studied does not mean that the study itself makes being occur; A guarantees only the content of this sentence.
Proposition / phrase in the original: Being is said in many ways, but the senses are related to one focus (focused on substance).
Structural role of this evidence: It limits understanding “being” as a super-substance alongside the substances; this is a relational structure.
What it does not prove: Focal multiplicity of meaning does not mean the whole is undifferentiated, still less that the concept of substance can be deleted.
Proposition / phrase in the original: The same thing cannot at the same time and in the same respect both belong and not belong to the same determination.
Structural role of this evidence: It discusses the principle of non-contradiction on which argument itself depends; thought’s application to itself cannot be exempted from its limits.
What it does not prove: This is a principle of argument and of being, not a complete positive genetic account of “how thought itself arises from the ground”.
Proposition / phrase in the original: On the question of substance, the status of matter, form and the composite is examined.
Structural role of this evidence: The core concern turns to “what makes a thing truly what it is”.
What it does not prove: Book Ζ may not be reduced, on all readings, to a simple “independent existence of form”.
Proposition / phrase in the original: Asking why something is what it is: form or essence is the principle of explanation.
Structural role of this evidence: Explanation does not merely enumerate components, but must give the reason why they make up a whole.
What it does not prove: Showing that form bears functional load does not automatically prove that form is another thing separate from things.
Proposition / phrase in the original: The unity of a composite substance can be explained by matter as potentiality and form as actuality.
Structural role of this evidence: It places difference and unity in one structure, rather than simply giving up the discussion of form.
What it does not prove: Different books diverge in their use of “substance”, and not every problem can be judged solved.
Proposition / phrase in the original: Actuality is explained by distinctions from potentiality such as having seen and seeing, being able to build and having built.
Structural role of this evidence: The actuality / potentiality distinction of being belongs to the structural conditions of the world itself, and does not wait to be recognized in order to exist.
What it does not prove: Verbal actuality cannot be directly equated with ①’s “occurring itself”, nor classified by the meaning of a word.
Proposition / phrase in the original: To account for eternal motion, a principle that is always actual is proposed.
Structural role of this evidence: The first principle becomes the final load-bearing point of the explanation of cosmic order.
What it does not prove: The relation of its cosmological premises to modern science is a separate matter; the original structure is not to be altered because of differences in the history of science.
Proposition / phrase in the original: The unmoved moves other things as “being loved / desired”.
Structural role of this evidence: It distinguishes a final cause of motion from mechanical pushing: the ground does not need first to pass through right human cognition in order to act.
What it does not prove: The actual explanation of the celestial spheres and eternal motion has historical limits, yet remains important as structural evidence for this archive.
Proposition / phrase in the original: The highest actual activity is thinking;
in the immaterial case thinking and what is thought are the same.
Structural role of this evidence: In the ontological determination of the highest principle, thinking is not an added act of seeing; the actuality of god is the activity of thought. This is B-grade evidence that “divine cognition is internal to the highest structure”, not sufficient evidence for what ① requires, that “thought’s own proposing, speaking and understanding are all taken into the whole”.
What it does not prove: It cannot be inferred that god’s thinking and humans’ recognition of god through enquiry belong to one and the same non-deletable function; Λ7 does not directly explain how the philosopher’s own speech is generated by the highest principle, nor can it be classed as ② merely on the strength of the word “thinking”.
Proposition / phrase in the original: The highest thinking takes the best as its object, and comes down to “thinking of thinking”.
Structural role of this evidence: Divine self-thinking, as an ontological determination, cannot be deleted; if it were deleted, Book Λ’s definition of the best first activity would change. What occurs here is a structural-layer break in the ground itself, not a final-layer break necessarily caused by human recognition.
What it does not prove: That divine thinking is internal to the highest substance does not mean that right human knowing is the ultimate condition of completion of the whole system; the two kinds of “thinking” must be measured separately by their subject, object and function.
Proposition / phrase in the original: The soul is the first actuality of a natural body having organs.
Structural role of this evidence: It links cognition, life and the inner structure of the body: human cognition is not an independent spectator floating outside the world.
What it does not prove: First actuality does not mean that all the activities of a living human need no material basis.
Proposition / phrase in the original: The intellect that can receive knowledge and the active intellect are distinguished; the active intellect is called separable and pure actuality.
Structural role of this evidence: It poses a difficulty for “whether human cognition can be positively placed in the whole”: the nature of the active intellect is extremely disputed.
What it does not prove: The obscure account of III.5 may not be fitted, without examination, into later theories of an individual immortal subject.
Proposition / phrase in the original: From perception, memory and experience to universal principles; first principles cannot in turn be derived by demonstration without end.
Structural role of this evidence: Philosophical argument itself needs non-deductive starting points; the method of thought has boundaries.
What it does not prove: “The intellect grasps principles” is a condition for knowledge to hold, not that the fundamental world is complete only because it is “seen”.
Proposition / phrase in the original: Human happiness is defined as activity of the soul in accordance with virtue.
Structural role of this evidence: It determines the final human good as an activity, not the possession of some substance.
What it does not prove: “Completion” here is the completion of the human good, not the completion of the holding of the cosmic ground.
Proposition / phrase in the original: Complete happiness belongs first to the contemplation of the intellect, but the moral and mixed human life is also accounted for.
Structural role of this evidence: According to Ethics X.7—8, if continuing intellectual contemplation were deleted, the definition of “most complete happiness” would change directly; the break clearly belongs to the final layer (limited to the human good), not merely the loss of a teaching route.
What it does not prove: Book X says the highest object is the most knowable and divine, which is not strictly the same as every human contemplation “recognizing the cosmic first mover”; the ethical final-layer load makes ② a C-grade competing interpretation, but is not enough to rewrite all the tasks of natural and first philosophy.
Proposition / phrase in the original: The city is a community that comes to be by nature, and the human being is called a political animal.
Structural role of this evidence: It returns to language, ethics and social relations, without letting the account of cosmic principles swallow differentiated life.
What it does not prove: This norm coexists with the institutions of the time and the discussion of slavery, and may not be smoothed over by modernization.
οὐσία／substance: what is first asked about as “what is basic being”; its meaning is disputed across the books.
αἰτία／cause: the many senses of cause explaining why things are so, not merely mechanical pushing.
δύναμις／potentiality: the possible state of a thing’s becoming, or being able to be, so.
ἐνέργεια／actual activity: the mode of being as actual occurring and activity, which cannot simply be translated as a static “already there”.
ἐντελέχεια／actualized completion: an actual state tending towards or having its own end, especially crucial in psychology.
νοῦς／intellect: the capacity / activity of understanding forms and principles; divine and human intellect must be distinguished.
θεωρία／contemplation: theoretical beholding and higher-order activity; in Ethics X it has a normative role of completion.
τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὄν／being qua being: the enquiry into the first principles of being across particular disciplines.
Positive evidence: Metaphysics Γ1 directly establishes the object “being qua being”; Ζ／Η／Θ explain how substance is unified; Λ proposes the unmoved mover and its self-thinking.
Limiting evidence: “being” is said in many ways, and the unmoved principle and the many layers of substance cannot be compressed into one universal material; the Ethics also determines the contemplative level of happiness.
Disputed reading: if the divine thinking of Λ is taken as the sole endpoint of the whole system, this tends towards ②; if the actual tasks are reckoned by explanation in natural science, ④ is strong.
Present safe conclusion: the core works have a double task: on one side enquiring into being, substance and the highest cause, on the other explaining coming to be, life and civic order; both have evidence that cannot simply be subordinated, so the present judgment is ③ (C; the ③/④ boundary open), not decided by length of text or the author’s reputation.
Already withdrawn / de-substantialized: withdraws the sufficiency of separate Platonic Ideas for directly explaining concrete individuals; refuses to make being a single genus said univocally of all things.
Core structural load-bearing points: the unity of being’s many senses, the form—matter constitution of substance, the potentiality—actuality distinction, the first cause and actuality.
Disputed functional load-bearing points: divine self-thinking as god’s internal ontological activity; the human grasp of first principles as a condition of theoretical knowledge; contemplation as the final activity of complete happiness. The three load-bearing objects are interrelated but may not be swapped for one another.
Single object of deletion: delete only the function “right human knowledge of first principles”; keep god’s self-thinking, natural substances and their causes. Then, as a control, a separate ethical test “deleting continuing human contemplation” is performed, without merging the two tests into one.
What still holds after deletion: the motion of natural things, form—matter, potentiality—actuality and the self-thinking of the divine being still have independent definitions; but human theoretical knowledge and philosophical argument cannot keep their original form.
What breaks after deletion: a structural-layer break occurs in the acquisition of knowledge of first principles; but the ground itself does not thereby cease to hold. In the second, independent control test, if contemplation is deleted, the Ethics’ definition of complete happiness breaks directly, at the final layer.
Levels of break (fixed five-layer terminology): knowledge of first principles — structural layer; continuing contemplation in the highest human happiness — final layer; the ontological determination of divine self-thinking, if separately deleted — structural layer. The three may not be combined into a single final relation “humans must see the ground for the cosmos to be complete”.
Status within the complete ultimate structure: knowledge and contemplation are non-deletable in their respective subsystems, so ② has C-grade competing material; but whether they constitute the overall relation of completion “right recognition of the highest ground” is still unproven. For ③／④, judgment is made independently by the main task of thought and the final position.
The place of thought itself (self-reflexivity / self-inclusion): the principles of argument in Metaphysics Γ constrain argument itself (self-reflexivity); De Anima explains perception, learning and thinking as activities of life (B-grade local positive inclusion); the divine self-thinking of Λ is not a substitute for the self-inclusion of the author’s speech as a whole, and ①’s first condition is not established for the thought as a whole.
Return: intellectual contemplation coexists with virtuous action, friendship, the city and the study of nature; theoretical supremacy cannot be equated with abolishing the world of experience.
Another reasonable reading: the ④ reading stresses that natural science, biology and practical philosophy each have explanatory tasks not subordinate to first philosophy; the ② reading is driven by divine self-thinking and ethical contemplation, but must prove how they constitute the endpoint of one and the same “right seeing of the ground”. Neither can be settled by isolated sentences.
Present safest boundary / grade: main class ③ (C; the ③/④ boundary open); the ②-type link of divine self-thinking—human contemplation is a C-grade dispute, and local B-grade load does not automatically decide the overall class.
Positive evidence: the principles of argument in Metaphysics Γ cannot be applied only to others; De Anima analyses knowing, sensing and thinking as activities of life.
Limiting evidence: the logical consistency of self-reflexivity cannot replace a complete account of the origin of intellectual activity in the first principle of the cosmos; De Anima III.5 has long been disputed.
Disputed reading: divine self-thinking does make thinking internal to the highest principle; but how the thinking activity of humans in De Anima and concrete textual speech are located in the whole can neither be directly inferred from Λ alone nor be denied wholesale without reason.
Present safe conclusion: thought and knowledge have reliable local positive inclusion (B), but the complete self-inclusion required by ① is not yet established; and the main classification dispute is actually between ③／④, so one cannot leap to ①／② because self-thinking appears somewhere.
Positive evidence: Λ7／Λ9 express the highest actuality as thinking itself; Ethics X determines the highest happiness by human contemplation.
Limiting evidence: divine thinking belongs to god’s ontological activity, human contemplation to the ethical endpoint; the Ethics does not guarantee that the object of contemplation equals the first mover in every context.
Disputed reading: the two can form a ②-type interpretation of cognitive load, but it must still be proven that humans “rightly recognize the highest ground” and not merely the good of contemplation; ④ can also form a reasonable competitor for main task from independent natural / political explanation.
Present safe conclusion: ③ (C; the ③/④ boundary open); ② as a local C-grade alternative reading, which cannot automatically turn into one and the same function of completion because the words look alike.
Current main class: ③｜Inquiring into the Ground (C; the ③／④ boundary open)
Chain of argument: Books Γ and Α positively carry the fundamental enquiry into being qua being, substance and the first grounds (supporting ③); the Physics, De Anima, Politics and biological works are not simple illustrations of this enquiry; they independently explain the working and order of the world (supporting ④). Comparing the core question with the relative independence of each research task, the present evidence is not sufficient to give a B-grade exclusive ruling between ③／④.
No numerical scoring: the six positions are not a ranking of reputation, influence, scale of system or personal worth; only the final structure and the main task of thought are discussed here.
Organizing “how things are”, “how they change”, “how causes are explained” and “what makes for happiness” within a many-layered but testable framework of principles, neither smoothing away the world of differences nor reducing the highest cause to a mechanical efficient cause.
Grounds of the objection: The Physics and Politics do have a strong orientation towards explaining the world.
Present reply: The competing status of ④ is accepted and strengthened. Judgment can neither go by the number of books nor let one sentence of the Metaphysics override the whole system; the independence of the research tasks and the range of the final account keep a C-grade ③／④ dispute.
Grounds of the objection: The divine thinking of Λ7／Λ9.
Present reply: Λ7／Λ9 do positively determine thinking as god’s ontological activity (B); but divine self-thinking, human contemplation and “right recognition of the ground” are not the same function. ② has C-grade competing grounds, but does not yet constitute a ②-type completion of the thought as a whole.
Grounds of the objection: 1177a–1178a.
Present reply: It is accepted that contemplation is non-deletable at the final layer for complete happiness, and it is listed as one of the strong competing materials for ②.
But whether “the contemplation of happiness” equals the completion of “the ground being rightly recognized” must still be read together with the highest object and the natural system as a whole.
Grounds of the objection: De Anima III.5.
Present reply: The subject to which this passage belongs, and its separability, have long been disputed; it should be treated as C, and may not be filled in with later interpretations.
Grounds of the objection: The law of non-contradiction in Γ and the theory of soul in De Anima.
Present reply: Logical principles have a self-reflexive constraint, and cognitive activity also has local positive inclusion in De Anima, but the two alone cannot prove that ①’s first condition is fully met, still less that the function of right cognition of the ground can be deleted.
Grounds of the objection: Metaphysics Γ2, “being is said in many ways”, and the separate standing of sciences such as the Physics, De Anima and the Politics.
Present reply: While Γ2 grants that being has many senses, it determines that these senses are related “toward one focus” and that substance is the primary referent (E-06); Γ1 also states plainly that there is a science that studies “being qua being” (E-05). Multiplicity of sense limits treating being as a univocal highest genus; it does not cancel the unified inquiry into first principles. This confirms that the task of ③ holds, but it does not by itself outweigh the independent explanatory tasks of the sciences; ③/④ remains C.
With No.37 Heraclitus: they share an enquiry into world order, but Aristotle builds systematic argument on form, causes and logical self-checking; No.37 is currently placed at ④ (C), and this neighbour comparison shows that “whether systematic” is not the only criterion. With No.40 Plato: as a comparative hypothesis awaiting verification, Aristotle’s substance and form lay more stress on explanatory principles internal to concrete individuals; to be reviewed against the No.40 archive.
First, what is dismantled: withdraws the sufficiency of separate Platonic Ideas for directly explaining concrete individuals; refuses to make being a single genus said univocally of all things.
Second, what remains at the end: the unity of being’s many senses, the form—matter constitution of substance, the potentiality—actuality distinction, the first cause and actuality.
Third, where thought itself is: the principles of argument have a self-reflexive constraint, and cognition has B-grade local placement in the structure of life and soul, but complete self-inclusion and ①’s two conditions are not yet established.
Fourth, the most delicate point and the degree of certainty: divine self-thinking, human contemplation and recognition of the first ground may not be confused; the ③／④ main-task boundary is kept at C.
Present conclusion: ③｜Inquiring into the Ground (C; the ③／④ boundary open). ③ and ④ compete on the main task of the whole set of core works, not decided by terms, reputation or length of text.
• Metaphysics Γ1, Greek text (Perseus) https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0051:book=4
• Metaphysics Λ7／Λ9, Greek text with Ross’s English translation in parallel https://aristotle.johnhboyer.com/Meta/book/12/
• Metaphysics Λ7, Λ9, English translation (MIT) https://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/metaphysics.12.xii.html
• Nicomachean Ethics X.7 (Perseus) https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0054:book=10:chapter=7
• Textual disputes over De Anima III.5 (SEP, supplementary) https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-psychology/active-mind.html
• Recent survey of research on the Metaphysics (SEP, supplementary) https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-metaphysics/
Scope of collation and disputes: Metaphysics Λ7 (1072b18–30) and Λ9 (1074b15–35) have been rechecked against a Greek–English parallel text, in which “ἡ νόησις νοήσεως νόησις” belongs to the same argumentative passage of Λ9. The Greek follows an electronic transcription of Ross’s edition, and not all variants have been collated one by one; the relation of divine thinking to human contemplation, the attribution of the active intellect in De Anima III.5, and the ③／④ main task remain open according to the C-grade evidence in the archive.
Limits of editions: this archive takes verifiable locations in the original texts and explicitly named translations as its evidential basis; the word-for-word collation of variant texts not yet completed and divergences of interpretation honestly limit the strength of its judgments, and unchecked content is not used to prove that the author did or did not answer.