Mengzi in seven books (received text)
Mengzi in seven books (received text)
「人皆有不忍人之心」 (“All people have a heart that cannot bear the suffering of others.”)
「盡其心者，知其性也」 (“One who fully realizes one’s heart knows one’s nature.”)
「民為貴，社稷次之，君為輕」 (“The people are most precious, the altars of the state come next, and the ruler is the least.”)
Note: the marks are all taken from the E evidence cards below; for their sources and levels see the corresponding cards. The overall structure is not inferred from isolated sentences here.
Mengzi grounds humaneness, rightness, ritual propriety and wisdom in the heart that cannot bear others’ suffering, in the goodness of human nature and in the four sprouts; he explains moral formation and humane government through extending, preserving and nourishing, and accumulating rightness.
At the same time, the first chapter of “Jinxin I” places in one continuous sequence fully realizing the heart, knowing one’s nature, knowing Heaven, preserving the heart, nourishing one’s nature, serving Heaven, and cultivating oneself to establish one’s destiny; knowing Heaven cannot be demoted to a marginal exhortation. The current main task still turns on the practice of human relations and political norms; the current judgment is ④ (B), with ③ as a C-grade competing interpretation with substantive grounds, and the cognitive condition of completion required by ② tested separately.
Current placement｜④｜“Explaining the World” (B); ③ is a well-grounded C-grade competing interpretation; the necessity of cognitive completion across the whole book required by ② has not been established
Central question｜When the whole thought is complete, what structure, relation and function cannot be deleted? For figures at ③ / ④, first judge their main task; for ② candidates, then test whether right cognition of the ground is a necessary relation of the complete ultimate structure.
This archive separates “how reliable a text is as evidence of thought” from “how certain a structural judgment drawn from the evidence is”. T1 = core, relatively early texts or texts with relatively strong authorial attribution; T2 = reliable texts with limitations of recording, transmission or editing; T3 = late texts, single transmissions, or texts with marked disputes over attribution or chapter layers; T4 = later commentary, biography or school development. The specific T-level definitions for each author are given in Section 3.
A = a fact stated directly in the text; B = a strong structural inference supported by several original passages; C = grounded in the sources, with an equally reasonable alternative reading; D = an opposing stress test / a hypothesis awaiting verification. An A-grade quotation does not by itself make its philosophical interpretation A.
Direction: supports = supports the current six-position placement; limits = reveals a functional mediation or a boundary of analysis; disputed = two opposing readings must still be weighed; neutral = the text is meaningful but does not directly decide the main class. The direction label does not replace interpretation.
The Mengzi is an early received text of debates associated with Mengzi and his school; “T1” means the relatively stable text transmitting the core of Mengzi’s thought, not proof that every sentence was written down by Meng Ke himself. This archive relies on the received text and has not systematically collated silk or bamboo manuscripts or the various Song printed editions; stories in the text must be distinguished from Mengzi’s direct statements.
All classical texts are located by the online received texts listed in “Sources and Edition Notes”; some quotations keep traditional character forms. The online base text is used for searchable checking and is not a word-by-word collation against images of manuscripts, stone inscriptions or old printed editions. If a reliable critical edition reveals substantive variants, they should be listed explicitly and the affected structural judgments re-examined.
Treated separately: ① the relation between the goodness of nature, the Way of Heaven and the world of human relations; ② the final load-bearing point and the counterfactual of deletion; ③ whether the thought’s own debating, speech and being understood lie within its core structure; ④ whether the cognition—practice relation in the first chapter of “Jinxin I” can change the main task of the thought.
The core does not let the number of quotations or chapter position replace structural judgment.
1｜From the competition for profit to the demand for humaneness and rightness (E-01—03)
2｜From the heart that cannot bear others’ suffering to the four sprouts and the inner ground of the goodness of nature (E-06—12)
3｜From extending, accumulating rightness and nourishing the qi to everyday practice and governance (E-04—08, E-18—19)
4｜From fully realizing the heart—knowing one’s nature—knowing Heaven, to preserving the heart—nourishing one’s nature—serving Heaven—cultivating oneself to establish one’s destiny; linking the Way of Heaven and the way of humans through sincerity and turning back to oneself (E-15—17, E-21)
5｜Returning to the human order of the people and the kingly Way (E-19—20)
The chain only states this archive’s current reconstruction;
if the material across chapters admits other, equally reasonable organizations, the dispute should be kept open, and fluent narration should not replace textual evidence.
This evidence bank again distinguishes two sets of grades: T1 is core evidence that is relatively early, has relatively strong authorial attribution or is stable across texts; T2 is reliable evidence limited in transmission, authorship or recording; T3 is late, singly transmitted, or evidence with marked disputes over attribution or edition; T4 is later commentary, biography and school development. The T-level limits for specific chapters are given in Section 3.
A = the original text says it directly (proving only that the text says so); B = a strong structural inference supported by several original passages; C = grounded, but with an equally reasonable alternative reading; D = an opposing stress test or a hypothesis awaiting verification. An A-grade quotation does not automatically give its interpretation A. Supports = supports the current six-position judgment; limits = shows that a functional mediation or boundary remains; disputed = the direction of the text is not unique; neutral = the quotation exists but does not for now constitute a core limit in the deletion test.
The E cards list the original text, edition, level, direction, structural role and limits of interpretation; any excerpt must be read together with its context and the thought of the whole text, and a single sentence cannot replace the overall structure.
Original excerpt: 「王何必曰利？亦有仁義而已矣。」“Why must Your Majesty speak of profit? There is only humaneness and rightness.”
Role in this archive: It turns political persuasion from the competition for profit toward humaneness and rightness; the main axis of the way of governing is human norms.
What it does not prove: The political order of priorities cannot be interpreted directly as a complete cosmology.
Original excerpt: 「不違農時，穀不可勝食也。」“If the farming seasons are not interfered with, there will be more grain than can be eaten.”
Role in this archive: Humane government includes a concrete order of the people’s livelihood and the use of resources.
What it does not prove: A concrete political institution is not the same as the highest reality.
Original excerpt: 「保民而王，莫之能禦也。」“Protect the people and be a true king, and no one can stop you.”
Role in this archive: The way the kingly Way is completed is by protecting the people, not by a special event of seeing one’s nature.
What it does not prove: Political success is not the sole ultimate concern of the thought.
Original excerpt: 「我知言，我善養吾浩然之氣。」“I understand words, and I am good at nourishing my flood-like qi.”
Role in this archive: Cognition and the cultivation of life appear closely in parallel; one must judge whether understanding words bears load independently.
What it does not prove: “Understanding words” is directed at the biases of speech, and cannot automatically be equated with seeing the ground.
Original excerpt: 「是集義所生者，非義襲而取之也。」“It is produced by accumulated rightness, not seized by a sudden show of rightness.”
Role in this archive: The flood-like qi comes from accumulated practice in accord with rightness, opposed to an accidental, external seizing.
What it does not prove: The qi may not be substantialized, nor practice dissolved into a cognitive event.
Original excerpt: 「人皆有不忍人之心。」“All people have a heart that cannot bear the suffering of others.”
Role in this archive: Political and moral capacity takes the universal heart that cannot bear others’ suffering as its thread.
What it does not prove: “All have” does not mean that everyone has already fully accomplished humane government.
Original excerpt: 「惻隱之心，仁之端也；羞惡之心，義之端也。」“The heart of compassion is the sprout of humaneness; the heart of shame is the sprout of rightness.”
Role in this archive: The four sprouts link ethical norms to moral beginnings that can be experienced.
What it does not prove: A sprout is not a fully formed virtue; it must be “extended and filled out”.
Original excerpt: 「苟能充之，足以保四海；苟不充之，不足以事父母。」“If one can fill them out, it is enough to protect all within the four seas; if one does not fill them out, it is not enough even to serve one’s parents.”
Role in this archive: Extending the four sprouts constitutes the necessary functional relation from human relations to politics.
What it does not prove: The load here belongs mainly to normative practice, not to an independent seeing of the ground.
Original excerpt: 「天時不如地利，地利不如人和。」“Opportune times from Heaven are not as good as advantages of terrain; advantages of terrain are not as good as harmony among people.”
Role in this archive: It places the key to political success or failure in human relations and popular support.
What it does not prove: It is not a wholesale rejection of Heaven and nature.
Original excerpt: 「人性之善也，猶水之就下也。」“The goodness of human nature is like water’s tendency to flow downward.”
Role in this archive: The goodness of nature serves as the basic premise of human nature for ethical cultivation.
What it does not prove: “The goodness of nature” is a tendency of potential, not automatically accomplished virtuous conduct.
Original excerpt: 「仁義禮智，非由外鑠我也，我固有之也。」“Humaneness, rightness, ritual propriety and wisdom are not welded onto me from outside; I originally have them.”
Role in this archive: It treats humaneness, rightness, ritual propriety and wisdom as inwardly possessed, providing evidence for the question of the mind-nature ground for ③.
What it does not prove: Original possession does not mean that the cognitive function or the effort of completion can be deleted.
Original excerpt: 「心之所同然者何也？謂理也，義也。」“What is it that hearts agree on? It is called principle, it is called rightness.”
Role in this archive: Human hearts share judgments of principle and rightness, pointing to a universal standard beyond habit.
What it does not prove: One cannot, on the strength of the word “principle” alone, identify it as an independent cosmic reality.
Original excerpt: 「舍生而取義者也。」“… one who gives up life and takes rightness.”
Role in this archive: In judgments of choice, rightness ranks above the interest of survival.
What it does not prove: “Giving up life” is not the sole final definition of cultivation.
Original excerpt: 「學問之道無他，求其放心而已矣。」
“The way of learning is nothing other than seeking the lost heart.”
Role in this archive: Seeking the lost heart turns the practice of thought back toward the subject’s heart; it is both cognition and ethical cultivation.
What it does not prove: “Seeking” is a mixed function of retrieving, preserving and practising, and cannot directly ground a judgment of ②.
Original excerpt: 「盡其心者，知其性也。知其性，則知天矣。」
“One who fully realizes one’s heart knows one’s nature. Knowing one’s nature, one knows Heaven.”
Role in this archive: The opening sentence of the first chapter of “Jinxin I” states explicitly the successive relation of fully realizing the heart, knowing one’s nature and knowing Heaven; it is the chain of fundamental cognition of mind-nature and Heaven, and cannot simply be classed as an ordinary technique of governance or an added explanation; it supports and is supported by serving Heaven and establishing destiny in E-16 and by reflecting on sincerity in E-21.
What it does not prove: The status of the opening chapter adds weight to the evidence, but cannot directly prove that the chapter was arranged by Mengzi himself as the general outline of the whole book, nor does it alone prove that the final completion of every moral formation and of humane government must involve an independent event of “rightly recognizing Heaven”; it should not be required to be “the only way” in order to bear load.
Original excerpt: 「存其心，養其性，所以事天也。」“Preserving one’s heart and nourishing one’s nature is the way to serve Heaven.”
Role in this archive: Following “knowing Heaven” in the same opening chapter, “preserving the heart—nourishing one’s nature—serving Heaven” and “not wavering whether life is short or long, cultivating oneself to await it—establishing one’s destiny” explain practice and the completion of life; knowing Heaven and serving Heaven should be regarded as two mutually supporting aspects, not as the latter automatically negating the former.
What it does not prove: The order of the text can show that the two are continuous, but does not directly stipulate a one-way necessary relation that “knowing Heaven must precede serving Heaven” or that “only serving Heaven makes knowing Heaven hold”;
both readings are kept open for discussion.
Original excerpt: 「萬物皆備於我矣。反身而誠，樂莫大焉。」“The myriad things are all complete in me. To turn back to oneself and find sincerity — there is no greater joy.”
Role in this archive: “The myriad things are all complete in me” and “turning back to oneself and finding sincerity” carry a strong sense of reflexive return and of the interpenetration of humans and the myriad things; the same chapter goes straight on to “exert yourself in reciprocity and act; nothing is closer to seeking humaneness”, showing that the sincerity of turning back to oneself is not detached from reciprocity and seeking humaneness.
Self-inclusion is a C-grade candidate that can be tested, not something to be refused merely on the ground that it is not subjective idealism.
What it does not prove: “The myriad things are all complete in me” does not state explicitly the specific position, within the structure of Heaven—heart—sincerity, of this book’s own propounding, debating, language and readers’ understanding; turning back to oneself and self-inclusion may not be equated, nor can ① be judged directly from the general “all complete”.
Original excerpt: 「窮則獨善其身，達則兼善天下。」“In obscurity one makes oneself good; in prominence one makes the whole world good as well.”
Role in this archive: Self-cultivation and the politics of the world stand in a relation of continuity, not as two mutually exclusive realms.
What it does not prove: It does not say that kingly government can be realized in every situation.
Original excerpt: 「民為貴，社稷次之，君為輕。」“The people are most precious, the altars of the state come next, and the ruler is the least.”
Role in this archive: The people’s status ranks above the ruler’s, so that political institutions are constrained by normative principles.
What it does not prove: It cannot simply be translated into a modern theory of democratic sovereignty.
Original excerpt: 「仁也者，人也。合而言之，道也。」“Humaneness is being human. Put together, it is the Way.”
Role in this archive: It links “the Way” to the humaneness of human relations, limiting ontological interpretations detached from practice.
What it does not prove: It can also be read as saying that the ground lies within human relations themselves; one must guard against describing ④ as having no ground.
Original excerpt: 「誠者，天之道也；思誠者，人之道也。」“Sincerity is the Way of Heaven; reflecting on sincerity is the way of humans.”
Role in this archive: “Sincerity is the Way of Heaven; reflecting on sincerity is the way of humans” states explicitly that the Way of Heaven and human reflection on sincerity are distinct yet connected; together with E-15—17 it forms systematic material for Mengzi’s deeper ground, and its fundamental significance cannot be cancelled merely because more space is given to humane government.
What it does not prove: “Reflecting on sincerity” and “sincerity” are not wholly synonymous; their necessity must be tested.
Goodness of nature｜humans have sprouts and capacities tending toward the good; this does not mean that conduct is always already good
Four sprouts｜the four ethical beginnings of compassion, shame, deference and the sense of right and wrong
Extending｜actually extending the sprouts into virtue and politics
Flood-like qi｜a vital disposition nourished by accumulated rightness; it cannot simply be substantialized
Lost heart｜the heart that has strayed or been dispersed; one must seek again where it is and its proper action
Fully realizing the heart｜involves knowing one’s nature and knowing Heaven, and must also be read together with preserving, nourishing and serving Heaven
Sincerity｜a word connecting the Way of Heaven and the way of humans; not the same as a purely intellectual judgment
Positive evidence｜E-11 and E-12 give the inner ground of humaneness, rightness, ritual propriety and wisdom; E-15—17 and E-21, with fully realizing the heart, knowing one’s nature and knowing Heaven, preserving, nourishing and serving Heaven, turning back to oneself and finding sincerity, and the sincerity of the Way of Heaven / the way of humans, form a strong cross-chapter structure that cannot be reduced to a scattered “deep background”.
Limiting evidence｜E-01—03, E-06—08 and E-18—20 repeatedly realize the mind-nature ground as extending the good sprouts, choosing rightness, practising humane government and people-centred politics, and the same chapter as E-17 closes with “exert yourself in reciprocity and act; nothing is closer to seeking humaneness”. The main unfolding of the text still centres on moral formation and on regulating human relations.
Disputed reading｜if fully realizing the heart—knowing Heaven is interpreted as right knowledge of the ground that every perfection of virtue must pass through, and Heaven is defined as the final end of all human relations, then the ③ and ② directions are strengthened; but such a necessity of completion has not received exclusive strong evidence from the whole book.
Safest conclusion at present｜the textual chain of cognition of “knowing Heaven” and the interpenetration of mind, nature and Heaven are B; that it rewrites the main task of the whole book or becomes a non-deletable ultimate cognitive mediation remains C. ④ (B) is maintained, with ③ competing at C; ④ does not mean having no fundamental ground.
Already withdrawn / de-substantialized｜external profit as the sole measure of politics; treating humaneness and rightness entirely as things welded on from outside; understanding moral formation merely as reciting knowledge.
Core structural load-bearing point｜good sprouts of nature—extending and accumulating rightness—preserving the heart and nourishing nature / turning back to oneself and finding sincerity—practice of humaneness, rightness, ritual propriety and wisdom—humane government and putting the people first; “fully realizing the heart, knowing one’s nature, knowing Heaven—serving Heaven, establishing destiny” is an explicit deep chain of completion and should not be reduced to a dispensable explanation.
Disputed functional load-bearing point｜from fully realizing the heart, knowing one’s nature and knowing Heaven, to preserving, nourishing, serving Heaven and establishing destiny: whether “knowing Heaven” is a non-deletable relation of right cognition of the ground for the whole structure of moral formation / humane government; the positive chain within the single chapter is strong, its independent necessity across the whole book remains C.
Nature of the load-bearing point｜mainly normative practice, with cognition and preserving-nourishing as related functions; not an obtainable entity.
What still holds after deletion｜withdraw an independent function of “rightly recognizing Heaven”, and the original ground of the goodness of nature and the four sprouts, and part of the norms of humane government, can still be stated; but the complete chain of knowing Heaven—serving Heaven—establishing destiny stipulated in the first chapter of “Jinxin I” no longer holds as it stands, and one cannot say that the whole thought is entirely unharmed.
Where it breaks after deletion｜delete extending, accumulating rightness and the practice of humaneness and rightness, and the good sprouts cannot complete virtue and humane government — a break at the structural level (B). Delete knowing Heaven, and at least the relation of fundamental cognition and establishing destiny in the first chapter of “Jinxin I” loses a link;
whether the complete ultimate structure of the whole Mengzi, with humane government as its axis, also breaks remains C, and one may not smuggle in an exclusion by saying “it is not the only way”.
Level of the break｜extending / righteous conduct: structural level B; fully realizing the heart—knowing one’s nature—knowing Heaven—serving Heaven—establishing destiny: structural level within this chapter B; extended into the final cognitive mediation of the whole book C.
Complete ultimate structure and mode of existence after completion｜Mengzi is neither content merely to “know that nature is good”, nor does he treat knowing Heaven as an irrelevant ornament. Knowing Heaven, preserving and nourishing, serving Heaven, and cultivating oneself to establish destiny are linked in the first chapter of “Jinxin I”; the realization of humaneness and rightness and political action run through the other chapters.
Position of the thought itself｜self-reflexivity: understanding words and turning back to oneself to find sincerity can constrain one’s own cognition and conduct; self-inclusion: the interpenetration of mind, nature and Heaven and the relation between the Way of Heaven and reflecting on sincerity provide a fairly strong candidate for internal placement of his own cognition and thinking, but do not directly explain how the speech of this body of debates and readers’ understanding belong to the same whole; self-reflexivity ≠ self-inclusion; candidate C.
Return｜it returns explicitly to the farming seasons, the people’s livelihood, political legitimacy and the situation of the scholar (E-02, 03, 18—20).
Another reasonable reading｜the opening of “Jinxin I” writes “knowing Heaven—serving Heaven—establishing destiny” as a deep chain of completion, so one can maintain that Mengzi’s core task is not only to regulate the human world but also to reach directly to Heaven and nature as the ground. Compared with the functional chains of humane government, extending and choosing rightness across the whole book, this is not at present enough to raise it to a stronger main class; the dispute is kept at C.
Safest boundary at present｜④ (B); ③ a strong and grounded competing interpretation C; a ② candidate would need to prove that knowing Heaven is a non-deletable relation of cognitive completion for the complete ultimate structure of the whole book, not merely an important link in one chapter.
Grade of judgment｜core textual assertions A; the main cross-chapter structure is at present a working inference at B; alternative interpretations that cannot yet be excluded by equal evidence are C.
Positive evidence｜E-04 on understanding words, E-17 on turning back to oneself and finding sincerity, E-21 on the Way of Heaven / the way of humans and reflecting on sincerity, and E-15 on knowing Heaven show that cognition and reflection are actively incorporated into the structure of moral formation; “the myriad things are all complete in me” has significance as a candidate for self-inclusion.
Limiting evidence｜this does not mean that Mengzi has positively explained the position, within the whole of Heaven, of all his speech, his disciples’ understanding and his own argument. The general “all complete” cannot replace a structural account running through the whole, nor can later self-inclusion theories of Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism be read back as Mengzi’s own words.
Disputed reading｜an author’s account of speech, reflection, names or the heart can be read as a structure in which the thought is internally placed in the whole, or merely as a self-limitation of explanation / teaching; one must see whether it runs through the core relations.
Safest conclusion at present｜self-reflexivity and self-inclusion are recorded as separate matters;
judging ① requires the additional double proof of positive internal placement and deletion of the cognitive function, and cannot be upgraded merely because of a candidate for self-inclusion.
Most delicate point｜the first chapter of “Jinxin I” states explicitly both “fully realizing the heart—knowing one’s nature—knowing Heaven” and “preserving the heart—nourishing one’s nature—serving Heaven—cultivating oneself to establish destiny”; the two do not erase each other, but are successive cognition and practice. The key is whether this whole set of relations becomes the non-deletable final condition of all the moral formation / humane government in the Mengzi, or one of its deepest paths of self-explanation.
Positive evidence｜the “disputed” E cards marked in this archive and their surrounding text are the core; word frequency itself cannot be taken as a necessary condition.
Limiting evidence｜the normative, practical and cognitive vocabulary of the same author may cut across the layers of expression, teaching, path, structure and ending.
Disputed reading｜the same word can be a naming permission, a mode of entry, a functional completion or a definition of the structure of existence; this must still be discriminated within the text.
Safest conclusion at present｜④ (B); ③ competing at C, and the whole-book non-deletable cognitive condition for ② still unproven. The systematic evidence of knowing Heaven is itself B, and is not weakened by the classification at ④.
Current conclusion｜④｜“Explaining the World” (B); ③ a well-grounded C-grade competing interpretation; ② would have to prove that knowing Heaven cannot be deleted in the ultimate completion of the whole book
Derived from the chain of argument｜the Mengzi does contain an account of mind, nature and Heaven as the ground, with especially strong evidence in the first chapter of “Jinxin I” and the discussion of sincerity in “Li Lou I”; but in the complete cross-chapter thought they mainly enter normative relations of extending the good sprouts, practising virtue, humane government and putting the people first. ③ is grounded, but does not show that “dealing with the ultimate ground” is more the primary work of the whole book than moral formation and politics;
② would need to establish, at the level of the whole book, that the cognitive completion of knowing Heaven cannot be deleted.
Limits and grade｜This is the current research placement, not a ranking of the six positions, still less a judgment of the value of human thought. A local C does not automatically change the main class to C; if the core deciding condition itself is only C, the boundary must be declared open.
He linked moral experience, the ground of the goodness of nature, the effort of preserving and nourishing, and public politics into a structure in which each can test the others: if the human heart that cannot bear others’ suffering is not extended, humane government cannot be completed; if political institutions lack humaneness and rightness, they cannot become the kingly Way.
The “highest achievement” here is this figure’s structural contribution on the path of his own thought, not a ranking of status; nor can later systems be used to supply all the premises the original text does not state explicitly.
Counter-question: Fully realizing the heart and knowing Heaven is already direct realization of the ground, so the main class should be ②
Current reply: E-15 is the opening of the first chapter of “Jinxin I”, and together with “preserving—nourishing—serving Heaven—establishing destiny” in E-16 stipulates a deep chain of completion (structural strength within this chapter B); it is not an isolated sentence. But the other main chapters of the Mengzi form multiple practical chains of completion through extending the four sprouts, accumulating rightness, humane government and putting the people first; no text is found that ties the holding of each relation of completion uniformly to a prior event of “rightly recognizing Heaven”. This is a six-position judgment of the whole book, not a belittling of “knowing Heaven”.
Counter-question: The goodness of nature / the four sprouts are an original structure that still exists after cognition is deleted, so it should be ①
Current reply: After “knowing Heaven” is deleted, the original possession of the good sprouts and their ethical ground still hold; this is only the passing of deletion at the level of the ground / sprouts; the relation of knowing Heaven—serving Heaven—establishing destiny in the first chapter of “Jinxin I” has already broken, and one cannot claim that the complete ultimate structure is unchanged. ① would also need to prove the positive internal placement of cognition and of its own debating, and to pass the complete structural deletion; this cannot at present be proven.
Counter-question: “The myriad things are all complete in me” proves a monistic mind-nature reality
Current reply: E-17 at the same time requires turning back to oneself to find sincerity, and cannot be detached from the discussions of the kingly Way in the various chapters; the grand ontological reading is kept at C.
Counter-question: The flood-like qi is an independent transcendent entity, so it cannot be classed at ④
Current reply: E-05 says it is produced by accumulated rightness, placing the qi first within the process of forming virtuous conduct; the substantialist reading is neither the only nor the strongest reading.
Counter-question: Inferring the whole system of later Song-Ming mind-nature theory from Mengzi
Current reply: Reverse interpretation by later Neo-Confucianism cannot replace Mengzi’s original text; T1 / T4 must be kept apart.
No.25 Confucius: both Confucius and Mengzi value humaneness and the human order, but Mengzi organizes the heart that cannot bear others’ suffering, the goodness of nature and the four sprouts into a more explicit mind-nature ground. A formal comparison of the ultimate positions of their thought should go back to the reliable current version of the No.25 archive, and should not use this archive to rewrite the conclusions on Confucius.
No.27 Xunzi: the divergence between the goodness and the badness of nature does not mean that one side has ethical thought and the other has none; the focus of comparison is the final load-bearing point of the formation of virtue (extending inner sprouts / transforming nature and establishing deliberate effort). A comparative hypothesis awaiting verification.
Limits of comparison｜Figures for whom current archives exist are read against each other at the same level of primary texts; researchers not yet independently completed are only compared as hypotheses awaiting verification.
On the basis of the heart that cannot bear others’ suffering and the goodness of nature and the four sprouts, Mengzi establishes the inner ground of humaneness, rightness, ritual propriety and wisdom, and through extending, accumulating rightness and humane governance gives it public effect. The first chapter of “Jinxin I” positively stipulates, with “fully realizing the heart, knowing one’s nature, knowing Heaven—preserving the heart, nourishing one’s nature, serving Heaven—cultivating oneself to establish destiny”, the continuous relation between fundamental cognition and the completion of life, and cannot be treated as a marginal sentence; but whether it governs all the final completion of the whole thought remains a reasonable C-grade dispute, and ④ (B) is maintained.
What it dismantles｜external profit as the sole measure of politics; treating humaneness and rightness entirely as things welded on from outside; understanding moral formation merely as reciting knowledge.
What finally cannot be deleted｜the relation of good sprouts and extending, accumulating rightness, practice of humaneness and rightness, humane government and putting the people first;
the first chapter of “Jinxin I” adds the deep load-bearing point of knowing Heaven—serving Heaven—establishing destiny, whose independent necessity across the whole book stays at C.
Whether the thought itself is within the whole｜turning back to oneself to find sincerity and understanding words support self-reflexivity; the discussions of mind-nature-Heaven / sincerity provide a substantive candidate for self-inclusion, but do not positively explain the overall position of its own speech, debating and understanding, and the isolated sentence “the myriad things are all complete in me” cannot serve as proof of ①.
To what grade the most delicate point can be judged｜knowing Heaven and serving Heaven are linked as a deep chain of completion (text A, structure within this chapter B), but its decisive significance for the whole book’s six positions remains C; current judgment ④ (B), ③ competing at C, the independent necessity for ② awaiting proof.
Full text of the Mengzi by chapter｜https://zh.wikisource.org/wiki/孟子/全覽
Mengzi, “Jinxin I”｜https://zh.wikisource.org/wiki/孟子/盡心上
Mengzi, “Gaozi I”｜https://zh.wikisource.org/wiki/孟子/告子上
Note on evidence levels｜The Mengzi is an early received text of debates associated with Mengzi and his school; “T1” means the relatively stable text transmitting the core of Mengzi’s thought, not proof that every sentence was written down by Meng Ke himself. This archive relies on the received text and has not systematically collated silk or bamboo manuscripts or the various Song printed editions; stories in the text must be distinguished from Mengzi’s direct statements.
Verification not completed｜Collation against images of the original editions of the received texts, finer division of authorship of some chapters, and correction of variants in all the short quotations have not been completed. Systematic collation of the quotations in the searchable online transcription against authoritative critical editions remains outside the completed scope; this archive does not claim to have collated against facsimiles.
Missing evidence is not resolved evidence｜classics, histories, the teaching background and the author’s other writings not yet listed may change the boundaries of the argument; one cannot therefore say that the author never answered.