Sengzhao

seeing the dharma of the real mark is seeing the Buddha” (E-37, E-38). The overall classification is ② “Direct Seeing of the Ground” (B): the ground holds without awaiting illumination, and both the subject and the object of illumination have been de-substantialized; but “illumination / awakening / seeing the real mark” is stipulated by Sengzhao as the content by which the sage’s mind is sagely and the Buddha is a buddha, and once deleted the completion layer breaks.

Most distinctive: Sengzhao is the one in prajñā learning who dismantles “cognition” most thoroughly while also insisting most firmly on “illumination”. What he dismantles is subject and object: knowing and the known arise in mutual dependence and belong to conditioned dharmas, so they are not real (E-23); what he keeps is the illuminating function: “knowing without marks, illumination without knowing” (E-18 context passage), “illumination does not lose emptiness, emptiness does not lose illumination” (E-20). This makes his text supply at once the strongest material for the de-objectification of cognition in the ① direction and the strongest material for defining completion in the ② direction. (A: stated explicitly in the text; overall structure B)

Final load-bearing point: seen in three layers.

(1) The ground layer: original non-being, real mark, dharma-nature, emptiness of nature, conditioned arising “are one meaning”, “the real mark is non-existent of itself, not made non-existent by inference” (E-05); stillness is not apart from movement (E-08); the myriad things are themselves empty (E-14); where one stands is the real, touching things one meets the real (E-16). This layer does not await prajñā, and the deletion test passes. (2) The dismantling layer: names and realities do not correspond (E-15); nirvāṇa has no separate place (E-07); knowing with an intending mind cannot attain nirvāṇa (E-28); knowing as subject and object is not real (E-23). (3) The completion layer: the sage’s mind is defined by “nothing it does not know” and “all-knowing” (E-18); “makes his illumination real” (E-19); illumination cannot be abolished (E-20); the prajñā that does not know illuminates the real truth that has no marks (E-21); the Buddha is “the name for great awakening”, seeing the real mark is seeing the Buddha (E-37, E-38); “Nirvāṇa Is Nameless” (T2) says “the dark Way lies in wondrous awakening” (E-29) and “the way of nirvāṇa lies in wondrous accord” (E-32). The B inference for ② depends on the third layer, and the third layer is explicit in the T1 “Prajñā Is Not Knowing” and the Commentary on the Vimalakīrti.

Most delicate point: the conclusion of “Emptiness of the Unreal”, “Is the Way far? Touching things, one meets the real! Is the sage far? Embodying it is the numinous!” (E-16), gives two layers within one sentence: the real is not apart from things (not awaiting cognition), and the sage is conditioned on “embodying it”. The chapter on dark attainment in “Nirvāṇa Is Nameless” further says “all sentient beings are by nature constantly extinguished and are not extinguished again. This is called extinction and crossing over, and lies in non-extinction” (E-33), and goes on to say “wondrous wisdom lies outside things, therefore one knows it by not knowing” (E-34 context passage). ① can say: “touching things, one meets the real” and “by nature constantly extinguished” are already completion, and “embodying it” and “wondrous wisdom” are only turning. This archive’s judgment is: in T1 Sengzhao defines “the sage’s mind”, “prajñā” and “the Buddha” themselves as illumination, awakening and seeing the real mark (E-18—E-21, E-37, E-38); this is not an instrument that “makes completion manifest”, but the content by which completion is called completion, and under v1.3 belongs to the “ending”. The full competing interpretation in the ① direction is retained at C.

Note on the texts: the Zhaolun is a collection compiled by later people, with a preface by Huida of Xiao Zhaoti Monastery at its head.

4. Delusion and awakening: the delusion of human feelings — facing the real with their eyes yet not awakening to it (E-09); the non-being of sagely wisdom is not knowing, the non-being of deluded wisdom is knowing non-being (E-24).
5. The illumination of the sage’s mind: not knowing, yet nothing it does not know (E-18); emptying the mind yet making illumination real (E-19); illumination cannot be abolished (E-20); the prajñā that does not know illuminates the real truth that has no marks (E-21); function and stillness are one (E-25).
6. The Buddha and nirvāṇa: the Buddha is the name for great awakening, seeing the real mark is seeing the Buddha (E-37, E-38); the dark Way lies in wondrous awakening (E-29); the way of nirvāṇa lies in wondrous accord (E-32).
7. Speech: the real truth is outside names and teaching, yet is spoken of for the time being (E-13); entrusted to wild words (E-17); without words there is no way to transmit (E-22); the utmost purport is wordless, and words necessarily go against the purport (E-26).

The main line of this chain is: the ground is within the myriad things and holds without awaiting illumination;

Conflating the two would misread “things empty in themselves” as “illumination has been deleted”, or misread “illumination” as “the ground is made by illumination”.

Sengzhao places the ground in the emptiness of nature of the myriad things themselves: not outside the myriad things, not produced by observation.

The text has three groups of direct statements:

• The layer of one meaning: “original non-being, real mark, dharma-nature, emptiness of nature, conditioned arising — these are one meaning”; “the real mark is non-existent of itself, not made non-existent by inference, therefore it is called original non-being” (E-05, T2).
• The layer of identity with things: “one must seek stillness within all movements … therefore though moving it is always still” (E-08); “identical with the myriad things’ own emptiness; why would he wait to cut them apart in order to penetrate” (E-14); “it is not that one stands apart from the real; where one stands is the real … touching things, one meets the real” (E-16).
• The layer of names and realities: “if names and realities do not correspond, where are the myriad things?” (E-15); “the real truth is alone still outside names and teaching” (E-13).

Minimal test using T1 only｜Once “The Fundamental Meaning” and “Nirvāṇa Is Nameless” are stripped away, ① still has genuine positive evidence such as E-14’s “things empty in themselves”, E-16’s “touching things, one meets the real”, E-23’s “true wisdom too is not knowing” and E-25’s “function and stillness are one in substance”; but these mainly guarantee that the ground does not await illumination, that cognition is de-objectified and that stillness is not apart from function, and do not explicitly say that “the sage’s illuminating function can be deleted”. Therefore ① is a textually grounded, complete alternative reading at C, but has not, in T1 alone, completed the proof of “deleting the illuminating function” required against ②.

In Sengzhao the ① direction has two kinds of substantive material: the ground layer (things empty in themselves, where one stands is the real) and the de-objectification of cognition (true wisdom is not knowing, function and stillness are one). The latter is closer to ① of v1.3 than ordinary claims of “originally complete” and must be positively digested: what it dismantles is subject and object, not illumination itself.

Deletion test: from the complete structure, only the function “the illumination of prajñā” is deleted (the illumination of the sage’s mind, true wisdom contemplating the real truth, numinous illumination in dark harmony with the real mark, wondrous awakening and wondrous accord), keeping the real mark non-existent of itself, things empty in themselves, where one stands being the real, and the non-correspondence of names and realities, and keeping speech and teaching as a control. It is checked separately which layer breaks: the determination of the ground, the sage’s mind, the Buddha, nirvāṇa. One may not declare illumination deleted on account of words such as “not knowing”, “not knowing” or “without mind”, nor ignore Sengzhao’s positive determination of the real that is identical with things on account of “illumination”.

(1) The ground holds: the real mark non-existent of itself (E-05); stillness within movement (E-08); the myriad things empty in themselves (E-14); where one stands is the real (E-16). If illumination is deleted, these determinations do not change by a single word. The first layer of deletion passes; these are substantive positive evidence for the ① direction. (A: stated explicitly in the text)

(2) Dismantling and the learner: the correspondence of names and realities is dismantled (E-15); the localization of nirvāṇa is dismantled (E-07); the knowing of an intending mind is dismantled (E-28);

knowing as subject and object is dismantled (E-23). What can be deleted is knowing that grasps marks, the grasping of words, and a localized nirvāṇa; Sengzhao himself has already deleted them. But he did not delete illumination; while dismantling the knowing of subject and object, he established “knowing without marks, illumination without knowing” as the determination of the sage’s mind.

(3) Ultimate completion: in T1 Sengzhao gives the same structure in several places: “Prajñā Is Not Knowing” — “because the sage’s mind does not know, there is nothing it does not know. The knowing of not-knowing is called all-knowing” (E-18); “the sage empties his mind yet makes his illumination real” (E-19); “if one wishes to call it non-existent, the sage is numinous by it. The sage being numinous by it, emptiness does not lose illumination” (E-20); “the sage, with the prajñā that does not know, illuminates the real truth that has no marks” (E-21). The Commentary on the Vimalakīrti — “what is a buddha? It is the name for great awakening that exhausts principle and fully realizes nature” (E-37); “the Tathāgata’s numinous illumination is in dark harmony with the one real mark; the mark of the real mark is the Tathāgata’s mark … seeing the dharma of the real mark is seeing the Buddha” (E-38). The T2 “Nirvāṇa Is Nameless” goes in the same direction: “the dark Way lies in wondrous awakening” (E-29); “the way of nirvāṇa lies in wondrous accord” (E-32).

Judgment and point of breakage: withdrawing illumination while keeping the ground, the first layer remains complete: the real that is identical with things is unaffected. But “the sage’s mind” loses its determination — according to E-20, “if one wishes to call it non-existent, the sage is numinous by it”; take away illumination and sagely wisdom is left only with “non-being”, indistinguishable from “the non-being of deluded wisdom” (E-24); “the Buddha” loses its definition (E-37, E-38); the way of nirvāṇa loses that in which it lies (E-32, T2). The “necessity” here is not a necessity for the ground to hold, but a necessity for “the sage” and “the Buddha” to hold. The B break lies in “the sage’s mind / the Buddha”, not in “the real mark”.

Sengzhao’s own answer to the deletion test: “true wisdom contemplating the real truth never grasps what is known … therefore true wisdom too is not knowing” (E-23) and “function is stillness, stillness is function; function and stillness are one in substance; there is no stillness without function that presides over function” (E-25) are Sengzhao’s answers closest to ① on “whether cognition can be deleted”: subject and object can be deleted, and there is no master outside stillness. But the same treatise in the same places still says “wisdom is not without knowing” (E-23) and “the more obscure wisdom is, the brighter its illumination” (E-25 context passage).

What he deletes is the objectification of illumination and a master outside illumination, not illumination. Under rule 1 of v1.3, these statements belong alike to mature treatises, and nowhere is “makes his illumination real” withdrawn; under the supplementary rule for “judgment B”, the text directly stipulates the sage’s mind as illumination (E-19, E-20) and directly defines the Buddha as great awakening (E-37), which belongs to the “ending”.

Independence and limits of the evidence: E-17—E-25 come from “Prajñā Is Not Knowing”, E-37 and E-38 from the Commentary on the Vimalakīrti; the two are T1 of different genres (treatise and running commentary) and independent of each other. The T2 “Nirvāṇa Is Nameless” goes in the same direction (E-29, E-32), but this archive’s judgment does not depend on it. B rests not on the quantity of evidence but on “illumination” being established as the defining term of the sage and the Buddha in both kinds of T1 literature.

Systematic positive evidence for the ① direction and the deletion test: the strongest version of ① is: “prajñā does not know, true wisdom is not knowing, function and stillness are one; so-called illumination is only another way of saying that the real mark is self-luminous, not a function outside the real mark; what is more, ‘all sentient beings are by nature constantly extinguished and are not extinguished again’ (E-33).” This archive accepts the first half: illumination is indeed not an entity outside the real mark (E-20, E-25).

But “illumination is not outside the real mark” and “illumination can be deleted from the definition of the sage and the Buddha” are two questions: Sengzhao does not say that because illumination is one with stillness the deluded already have the illumination of the sage’s mind; what he says is “the non-being of sagely wisdom is not-knowing; the non-being of deluded wisdom is knowing non-being … that by which they are non-being differs” (E-24). E-33 comes from T2, and the same section still speaks in terms of “wondrous wisdom” and “knowing it” (E-34).

What has been withdrawn or de-substantialized: the correspondence of names and realities (E-15); a localized nirvāṇa (E-07); the knowing of an intending mind (E-28); knowing as subject and object (E-23); a still substance presiding outside illumination (E-25); seeking the real apart from things (E-08, E-16).

Final load-bearing point: things empty in themselves and where one stands being the real are Sengzhao’s strongest determinations of the ground; but in “Prajñā Is Not Knowing” and the Commentary on the Vimalakīrti Sengzhao consistently determines the sage’s mind and the Buddha by “illumination / awakening / seeing the real mark” — this illuminating function, stripped entirely of subject and object yet impossible to abolish, is the final load-bearing point.

the former is close to self-inclusion, the latter mainly self-reflexivity. The two must be assessed separately.

Self-reflexivity: holds. (1) Towards doctrines: the three schools of mind as non-being, matter as such and original non-being are criticized one by one (E-13 context passage). (2) Towards words: names and realities do not correspond (E-15). (3) Towards his own speech: “for the time being words are placed to approximate it” (E-13); “entrusting it to wild words” (E-17); “the utmost purport is wordless, words necessarily go against the purport” (E-26). These are subtractions from the tools of the thought itself.

Positive evidence of self-inclusion: partly holds, limited to cognition. Cognition is positively explained: knowing and the known arise in mutual dependence and belong to conditioned dharmas (E-23 context passage); true wisdom contemplating the real truth does not grasp what is known (E-23); function and stillness are one, with no stillness outside function (E-25). This shows that in Sengzhao “knowing” is placed as a link in dependent arising, and true wisdom is not two with the real truth. But regarding his own speech, Sengzhao only says “approximation”, “wild words” and “without words there is no way to transmit it” (E-13, E-17, E-22): speech is placed as an unavoidable instrument of communication, not as an occurrence of the ground. The Tathāgata’s teaching is said to be “riding the true mind that is not two, uttering teachings that are not one” (E-10);

• (3) The de-objectification of cognition: knowing and the known arise together and are not real; true wisdom is not knowing (E-23); function and stillness are one, with no stillness outside function (E-25).
• (4) The universalization of the completion layer: all sentient beings are by nature constantly extinguished and are not extinguished again (E-33); non-attainment is attainment, who alone is not so (E-34) (both T2).

These four layers together form a fairly complete candidate for the ① direction within prajñā learning, and must be taken seriously.

Why it is still ②:

• (1) The definition of the sage’s mind: “because the sage’s mind does not know, there is nothing it does not know” (E-18); “makes his illumination real” (E-19); “if one wishes to call it non-existent, the sage is numinous by it” (E-20). The sage’s mind is directly defined as the illumination of not-knowing; take away illumination and the sage’s mind cannot be distinguished from the non-being of deluded wisdom (E-24).
• (2) The definition of the Buddha: “what is a buddha? It is the name for great awakening that exhausts principle and fully realizes nature” (E-37); “seeing the dharma of the real mark is seeing the Buddha” (E-38).

• Even if “awakening” is “forcibly called”, the content chosen by the forced name is still awakening.
• (3) The structural sentence: “the sage, with the prajñā that does not know, illuminates the real truth that has no marks” (E-21). Both the subject and the object of illumination are de-substantialized, but the relation of illumination is kept as the very relation of the sage and the real truth.
• (4) Two layers in the same sentence: “touching things, one meets the real” is immediately followed by “embodying it is the numinous” (E-16); “by nature constantly extinguished” is immediately followed by “wondrous wisdom lies outside things, so one knows it by not knowing” (E-34 context passage). The sentences in the ① direction do not cancel illumination in Sengzhao’s text, but stand alongside it.
• (5) The deletion test: deleting illumination while keeping the ground, “the sage” and “the Buddha” lose their definitions, and what Sengzhao states explicitly, “the non-being of sagely wisdom is not-knowing; the non-being of deluded wisdom is knowing non-being” (E-24), becomes two indistinguishable kinds of “non-being”. The strongest version of ① can say that illumination is the self-luminosity of the real mark;

• this archive accepts that illumination is not outside the real mark (E-20, E-25), but not being external does not mean being deletable.
• (6) The exclusion condition: the highest is determined by “illumination” and “awakening”, and is not further placed within a more basic structure (Section 9). Even if the ① direction at the B layer were accepted, the third condition for ① could not be established. (B; competing reading C)

Source grade and terminological boundary: the load-bearing material for the ② direction in this archive (E-18—E-21, E-37, E-38) comes from T1; the strongest completion-layer material for the ① direction (E-33, E-34) comes from the T2 “Nirvāṇa Is Nameless”. “Prajñā”, “the sage’s mind” and “illumination” are Sengzhao’s terms, not this archive’s summaries; “not knowing” in Sengzhao is “knowing that does not grasp marks”, and this archive does not read it as “having no cognition”.

Grade: A grade is the text directly saying “because the sage’s mind does not know, there is nothing it does not know”, “the sage empties his mind yet makes his illumination real”, “the sage, with the prajñā that does not know, illuminates the real truth that has no marks”, “what is a buddha? It is the name for great awakening that exhausts principle and fully realizes nature”, “true wisdom too is not knowing” and “function and stillness are one in substance”;

Placement: ② “Direct Seeing of the Ground” (B; the ① direction has systematic positive evidence, with the key competing interpretation at C)

Why ②: on the one hand Sengzhao stipulates that the ground is within the myriad things and holds without awaiting prajñā, and strips the cognitive relation entirely of subject and object; on the other hand, in “Prajñā Is Not Knowing” and the Commentary on the Vimalakīrti he consistently determines the sage’s mind by “knowing without marks, illumination without knowing”, defines the Buddha by “great awakening” and “seeing the real mark”, and gives the relation between the sage and the real truth as “the sage, with the prajñā that does not know, illuminates the real truth that has no marks”. Illumination is de-substantialized but cannot be abolished; under v1.3, the sage’s mind and the Buddha take illumination and awakening as defining terms, which belongs to the “ending”. The primary load is borne by E-18, E-20 and E-21 of “Prajñā Is Not Knowing”; secondarily by E-37 and E-38 of the Commentary on the Vimalakīrti; E-29 and E-32 of the T2 “Nirvāṇa Is Nameless” go in the same direction.

Why it cannot yet be ①: ① must satisfy at the same time: both A and B hold; cognition and speech are self-included; the highest structure is not defined by a non-deletable awareness.

• The Commentary on the Vimalakīrti Sūtra (T38 no.1775): a combined edition; this archive quotes only the entries explicitly marked “Zhao says”. The compiler and date of compilation have not been checked in this archive.

Limits of external checking of the transmitted text｜Dunhuang and Turfan do contain fragments of Sengzhao’s separate commentary and early collected-commentary material, and modern research has shown that the editing and attribution of the present combined commentary require item-by-item scrutiny (Chi Limei, 2005, DOI:10.34613/todaibusseironshu.9.0_62; related studies of manuscripts of separate and collected commentaries). Since E-35—E-38 have not yet been collated sentence by sentence against the corresponding fragments, this archive follows the traditional T1 attribution of the “Zhao says” with the added qualification “transmitted text not checked word by word”; they are not a necessary condition that independently decides ②.

• Biography: Huijiao’s biography of Sengzhao in Gaoseng zhuan, fascicle 6 (T50 no.2059). The end of the biography records “he died at Chang’an in the tenth year of Yixi of the Jin, aged thirty-one”; the tenth year of Yixi is 414, from which a birth year of about 384 is reckoned by traditional counting of years of age. Divergent accounts in other sources have not been checked in this archive.