Great Master Zhizhe

Main texts

Mohe zhiguan 摩诃止观 (“The Great Calming and Contemplation”, spoken by Zhiyi, recorded by Guanding, T46 no.1911); Miaofa lianhua jing xuanyi 妙法莲华经玄义 (“Profound Meaning of the Lotus Sūtra”, T33 no.1716); Xiuxi zhiguan zuochan fayao 修习止观坐禅法要 (T46 no.1915); Liu miao famen 六妙法门 (T46 no.1917); Shi chan boluomi cidi famen 释禅波罗蜜次第法门 (T46 no.1916); Sijiao yi 四教义 (T46 no.1929). Attribution debated: Guanyin xuanyi 观音玄义 (T34 no.1726). Biography: Guanding’s Sui Tiantai Zhizhe dashi biezhuan 隋天台智者大师别传 (T50 no.2050). Commentarial layer: Zhanran’s Zhiguan fuxing chuan hongjue 止观辅行传弘决 (T46 no.1912).

Core-text marks

若無智起增上慢謂己均佛初後俱非｜理雖即是日用不知｜介爾有心即具三千｜即凡法是實法不須捨凡向聖

Current six-position placement

② “Direct Seeing of the Ground” (B; the ① direction has systematic positive evidence, and the key competing interpretation is C; the “returning to the great abode” passage itself is a two-directional C at the ① / ② boundary)

But in the same Mohe zhiguan Zhiyi uses the “six identities” to specify, step by step, contemplation and realization on the side of the practitioner: identity in principle is so, yet “日用不知” (“one uses it daily without knowing it”) (E-15); identity in contemplative practice requires that “必須心觀明了，理慧相應” (“the mind’s contemplation must be clear, and principle and wisdom must correspond”) (E-16); ultimate identity is “智光圓滿不復可增” (“the light of wisdom perfectly full, admitting no further increase”) (E-17); and the parable of the poor man’s treasure shows that the treasure is already present, yet must be known, dug out, opened and used (E-18). The six identities are not a sequence added from outside the perfect-and-sudden: “圓觀諸法，皆云「六即」” (“when all dharmas are contemplated perfectly, all are spoken of as the ‘six identities’”) (E-42). Zhiyi also states the reason for establishing the six identities: if, without wisdom, one “謂己均佛” (“says one is equal to the Buddha”), that is overweening pride (E-12). The overall classification is ② “Direct Seeing of the Ground” (B): the ground is inherently present at all times, and contemplation is not outside the real mark; but contemplation, wisdom and realization from identity in principle to ultimate identity are explicitly specified in Zhiyi’s main text as not to be confused and not to be omitted; the systematic positive evidence for the ① direction is kept as C.

The passage on “returning to the great abode” in the Mohe zhiguan, “三德非新非故，而新而故” (“the three virtues are neither new nor old, and yet new and yet old”) (E-39, E-40), is itself two-directional; it is judged a C at the ① / ② boundary and adds separate weight to neither direction.

What is most distinctive: Zhiyi turns the relation between ① and ② into an explicit, institutionalized structure — the six identities. All six positions are called “identity”: each is non-dual with the Buddha; and the six positions also “始凡終聖” (“begin with the ordinary and end with the holy”): from ordinary to holy there is a real difference. Zhiyi says the function of the six identities is twofold: “始凡故，除疑怯；終聖故，除慢大” (“because it begins with the ordinary, it removes doubt and timidity; because it ends with the holy, it removes pride and arrogance”) (E-13). The former prevents the ground from being pushed out of reach; the latter prevents identity in principle from being taken for ultimate identity. This is almost an advance answer to the v1.3 deletion test: the ground does not wait to be recognized (identity in principle), but completion waits on wisdom (ultimate identity), and taking the former for the latter is “overweening pride”. (A: stated in the text; overall structure B)

Last load-bearing point: Seen in three layers.

(1) The layer of the ground: a single thought is the principle of the tathāgatagarbha, with the three wisdoms inherently present (E-14); dharma-nature and all dharmas are not two and not different (E-10); as soon as there is the slightest mind, it contains the three thousand (E-21); the treasure is already in the house (E-18). This layer does not wait to be recognized, and passes the deletion test. (2) The layer of dismantling: the mind and the three thousand cannot be grasped — “四句求心不可得，求三千法亦不可得” (“seeking the mind by the four propositions, it cannot be found; seeking the three thousand dharmas, they cannot be found”) (E-23); mind and dharmas are neither vertical nor horizontal, “非識所識” (“not cognized by consciousness”) (E-22); understanding without practice is like “貧人數他財寶” (“a poor man counting another’s treasure”) (E-30); knowledge at the level of names is not bodhi (E-16). (3) The layer of completion: the six identities’ continuous specification of “not knowing in daily use — clear contemplation of the mind — the light of wisdom perfectly full” (E-15, E-16, E-17), their rationale and sequence (E-12, E-13), and “圓觀諸法，皆云「六即」” (“when all dharmas are contemplated perfectly, all are spoken of as the ‘six identities’”) (E-42); “非行不階” (“without practice one does not ascend”) (E-19); the ten modes of contemplation “將送行者到彼薩雲” (“escort the practitioner to sarvajña”) (E-20);

“迷苦集失法性……達苦集即會法性” (“deluded about suffering and its origin, one loses dharma-nature … penetrating suffering and its origin, one meets dharma-nature”) (E-11); the contemplation of the middle way, “了了見佛性” (“seeing the Buddha-nature clearly”) (E-29); and, as non-load-bearing side evidence of doubtful attribution, that the difference between the Buddha and the icchantika lies in “達” (“penetration”) (E-34, T2). The B inference for ② depends on the third layer; the functional specifications of the third layer are explicit in the main text of Zhiyi’s lectures, but “cannot be deleted” is a structural inference.

Most delicate point: “Identity in principle” and “ultimate identity” are both called “identity”. ① can say: since identity in principle already “is” the Buddha, the six identities are only names for the same Buddha-nature at different depths of contemplation; the difference lies not in the ground but only in “position”; delete the positions, and the ground is unharmed. This archive’s judgment is that Zhiyi established the six identities precisely in anticipation of this reading, and said explicitly that taking identity in principle as already equal to the Buddha is “overweening pride”. The difference of positions is not a difference of the ground but a difference of cognitive completion — exactly the link that v1.3 is designed to test. The strongest version of ① can go further: practice and realization, though they really take place, are simply the functioning of the ground;

contemplation is not outside the real mark, and so does not constitute an independent load-bearing function in the sense of v1.3. This archive accepts that contemplation is not outside the ground; what ② must show positively is that this functioning, though not external, has functions — “not knowing in daily use — clear contemplation of the mind — the light of wisdom perfectly full” — that cannot be replaced by “inherent presence in identity in principle” (see Part 8 and R-01). The full competing interpretation in the ① direction is kept as C.

Note on the text: Zhiyi’s extant works are almost all lecture records. The Mohe zhiguan is headed “spoken by the Great Master Zhizhe, recorded by his disciple Guanding”; Zhanran says there were three recensions in succession, and the present text is Guanding’s third, revised recension (E-05); moreover, the summer lectures at Yuquan Monastery reached only the “realm of views” among the ten realms, and the three chapters on retribution, arousing the teaching and the ultimate destination were never delivered (E-04); but the fifth summary point in the first chapter, “Great Purport”, namely “returning to the great abode”, was fully lectured; it is extant T1 main text, and cannot substitute for the missing tenth chapter (E-25, E-39, E-40). The famous “chapter on the perfect-and-sudden” comes from the preface written by Guanding, not from the main text of Zhiyi’s lectures (E-07).

• T4 = Guanding’s Sui Tiantai Zhizhe dashi biezhuan (E-01—E-03). Used only as background for Zhiyi’s life and his own statements.
• Sūtra background: the “Expedient Means” chapter of the Lotus Sūtra (E-37); the sixty-fascicle Huayan jing (E-38).

Version collation: the works used in this archive exist only in Chinese, and the Taishō collation is limited: the Mohe zhiguan takes the Ming edition as base text, collated with the Song edition held by the Library of the Imperial Household Ministry (宫) and a Tokugawa-period printed edition (甲); the Fahua xuanyi, the Sijiao yi and others take the Ming edition or Japanese printed editions as base. The variant notes on key sentences have been checked and are recorded in the cards; only a few affect meaning, such as “聞圓法／聞圓心” (E-08) and “即凡法是實法／實相” (E-10), and none changes the load-bearing structure. The more important textual question is the nature of the lecture records: recording, revision and incompleteness (E-04, E-05).

Method: following v1.3, three questions are kept apart: (a) whether the ground holds without waiting on wisdom — identity in principle, the non-duality of dharma-nature and all dharmas, three thousand in one thought, the treasure already present: yes;

(b) whether cognition and thought itself can be positively placed within the ground — one thought contains the three thousand, the mind, the Buddha and sentient beings are without difference, ignorance is dharma-nature: yes; (c) granted (a) and (b), if the cognitive completion from verbal identity to ultimate identity (hearing, contemplating, subduing, breaking, perfecting) is deleted, does Zhiyi’s account of bodhi, of seeing the Buddha-nature and of becoming a Buddha remain complete? The deletion test removes only the functions in (c), and keeps the scriptural teaching and the four kinds of samādhi as controls. The deletion test does not require the removed function to be an independent entity outside the ground: even if contemplation is non-dual with the real mark and is the functioning of the ground, whether its function can be deleted must still be tested. That those who have never contemplated and never realized may not be confused with ultimate identity proves only that the six identities retain a real distinction of positions; whether this can further be judged a function that cannot be deleted in the sense of v1.3 requires testing whether the positive specifications “not knowing in daily use — clear contemplation of the mind, correspondence of principle and wisdom — the light of wisdom perfectly full” can be replaced by inherent presence in identity in principle without loss of their explanatory function.

one must come to know it through hearing (verbal identity), practise it through contemplation (identity in contemplative practice), subdue through contemplation (identity in resemblance), break through by contemplation (identity of partial realization), until the light of wisdom is perfectly full (ultimate identity). The structural chain that unfolds from this is:

1. Three kinds of calming and contemplation: gradual, variable and perfect-and-sudden all take the real mark as object and are equally called calming and contemplation (E-06, E-35, E-31); the perfect-and-sudden is “non-dual in beginning and end” (E-07).
2. The ground inherently present: dharma-nature and all dharmas are not two and not different (E-10); a single thought is the principle of the tathāgatagarbha (E-14); as soon as there is the slightest mind, it contains the three thousand (E-21); the mind, the Buddha and sentient beings are without difference (E-26).
3. Dismantling grasping: mind and the three thousand are neither vertical nor horizontal, and cannot be found by the four propositions (E-22, E-23); understanding without practice is like counting another’s treasure (E-30).
4. The six identities: their rationale — removing doubt and timidity, removing pride and arrogance;

1. saying one is equal to the Buddha without wisdom is overweening pride (E-12, E-13); the Fahua xuanyi: to escape poverty one should diligently practise the three contemplations, to escape pride one should hear the six identities (E-41); the six identities are used in contemplating all dharmas perfectly (E-42); the specifications of identity in principle, verbal identity, identity in contemplative practice and ultimate identity (E-14—E-17); the parable of the poor man’s treasure (E-18).
2. Practice: without practice one does not ascend (E-19); the ten modes of contemplation escort the practitioner to sarvajña (E-20); calming and contemplation are the essentials for entering nirvāṇa (E-28).
3. Realizing the fruit: deluded one loses, penetrating one meets (E-11); the contemplation of the middle way sees the Buddha-nature clearly (E-29); ultimate identity is the light of wisdom perfectly full (E-17).
4. Inherent inclusion and penetration (side evidence): the Buddha does not cut off inherent evil, yet can penetrate evil (E-33, E-34, T2; non-load-bearing side evidence of doubtful attribution; deleting it does not affect the main line).

E-07—E-09 the chapter on the perfect-and-sudden and the perfect dharma in Guanding’s preface; E-10—E-25 the main text of the Mohe zhiguan: arousing the mind, the six identities, the four kinds of samādhi, the ten modes of contemplation and three thousand in one thought, and the five summary points with the ultimate destination; E-26—E-27 the Fahua xuanyi; E-28—E-32 the Xiao zhiguan, the Liu miao famen and the Sijiao yi; E-33—E-34 the Guanyin xuanyi, whose attribution is debated; E-35—E-36 an early work and Zhanran’s account of textual history; E-37—E-38 sūtra background, not counted as evidence of Zhiyi himself; E-39—E-41 are additions: the general and the specific explanation of “returning to the great abode” in the first chapter of the Mohe zhiguan, and the passage on the six identities in the Fahua xuanyi; E-42 is an addition: the question and answer on “speaking of the six identities in terms of the perfect” in the Mohe zhiguan. Variant notes are attached to key sentences.)

• The layer of the mind’s containing: “理即者，一念心即如來藏理……三智一心中具，不可思議” (“identity in principle: a single thought is the principle of the tathāgatagarbha … the three wisdoms are contained in one mind, inconceivably”) (E-14); “此三千在一念心……介爾有心，即具三千” (“these three thousand are in a single thought … as soon as there is the slightest mind, it contains the three thousand”) (E-21); “心、佛及眾生是三無差別” (“the mind, the Buddha and sentient beings — these three are without difference”) (E-26).
• The layer of non-duality: “夫法性與一切法無二無別……即凡法是實法，不須捨凡向聖” (“dharma-nature and all dharmas are not two and not different … the ordinary dharmas are themselves the real dharma; there is no need to abandon the ordinary and turn toward the holy”) (E-10); “法性不異苦集” (“dharma-nature does not differ from suffering and its origin”) (E-11); “生死即法身，煩惱即般若，結業即解脫” (“saṃsāra is the dharma-body, the afflictions are prajñā, the bonds of karma are liberation”) (E-09, T2); “無明法法性生一切法” (“the dharma of ignorance, together with dharma-nature, gives rise to all dharmas”) (E-24).
• The layer of inherent inclusion (non-load-bearing side evidence of doubtful attribution): “闡提斷修善盡，但性善在；

• 佛斷修惡盡，但性惡在” (“the icchantika has cut off cultivated good entirely, yet inherent good remains; the Buddha has cut off cultivated evil entirely, yet inherent evil remains”) (E-33, T2); of the good and evil of the nature, “性不可改，歷三世無誰能毀” (“the nature cannot be altered; through the three times no one can destroy it”). If this side evidence is deleted, the conclusion of this section is unchanged.

Zhiyi’s ground, then, is neither a transcendent entity nor an object of cognition, but the whole of the real mark inherently contained in any present thought — even the possibility of delusion and evil lies within it. This layer does not wait to be recognized: E-10, E-14, E-21 and E-26 all directly support the inherent presence of the ground. The inference for ② does not come from the layer of the ground, but from Zhiyi’s specification of the sequence of the six identities and of “penetration”.

Differences among all things: Zhiyi explains the differences among all things through the ten dharma-realms, the ten suchnesses and the three worlds (E-21, E-37), and classifies the whole of the Buddha’s teaching through the four teachings — tripiṭaka, shared, distinct and perfect — and the teachings of doctrine and of method (E-32). This is substantive content at the level of “explaining the world” among the six positions, and it is extremely systematic;

One may not declare the relation of completion abolished on the strength of words such as “identity”, “no need to abandon the ordinary and turn toward the holy” or “what is new, what is old”, nor ignore Zhiyi’s positive specification of the inherent presence of the ground on the strength of the sequence of the six identities. The deletion test also does not require the removed function to be an independent entity outside the ground (see Part 3). “Deleting the function” must be distinguished from “deleting what practice and realization bring about”: this test removes the role of the practitioner’s hearing, contemplating, subduing, breaking and realizing in the account of becoming a Buddha; it does not ask whether practice and realization are ontologically a separate thing.

(1) The ground holds: a single thought is the principle of the tathāgatagarbha (E-14); dharma-nature and all dharmas are not two and not different (E-10); as soon as there is the slightest mind, it contains the three thousand (E-21); the treasure is already in the house (E-18). Delete the completion of cognition, and these specifications do not change by a single word; identity in principle is itself one position among the six identities. The first layer passes the deletion test; these are substantive positive evidence for the ① direction, and may not be said to exist only after awakening. (A: stated in the text)

(2) Dismantling and the practitioner: the objectification of mind and the three thousand is dismantled (E-22, E-23);

cognition that stops at words is dismantled (E-16, E-30); seeking a holy realm apart from the ordinary is dismantled (E-10). What can be deleted is grasping at three thousand in one thought, verbal talk of the names of the Buddha-dharma, and the direction of seeking the holy apart from the ordinary; Zhiyi himself has already deleted them. But he did not delete the distinction between identity in principle and ultimate identity; he institutionalized it through the six identities.

(3) Ultimate completion: Zhiyi gives the same structure in several places. The Mohe zhiguan: “若無智，起增上慢，謂己均佛，初後俱非。為此事故，須知六即” (“without wisdom, one gives rise to overweening pride, says one is equal to the Buddha, and beginning and end are both wrong; for this reason one must know the six identities”) (E-12), “理雖即是，日用不知” (“though the principle is so, one uses it daily without knowing it”) (E-15), “必須心觀明了，理慧相應” (“the mind’s contemplation must be clear, and principle and wisdom must correspond”) (E-16), “等覺一轉，入於妙覺，智光圓滿不復可增，名菩提果” (“with one turn from equal awakening one enters wondrous awakening; the light of wisdom perfectly full, admitting no further increase, is called the fruit of bodhi”) (E-17), “耘除草穢而掘出之……近已藏開，盡取用之” (“he weeds away the grass and filth and digs it out …

having drawn near, the store is opened, and he takes and uses all of it”) (E-18), “夫欲登妙位，非行不階” (“if one wishes to ascend to the wondrous position, without practice one does not ascend”) (E-19), “迷苦集失法性……達苦集無苦集，即會法性” (“deluded about suffering and its origin, one loses dharma-nature … penetrating suffering and its origin, there is no suffering and origin, and one meets dharma-nature”) (E-11); the Xiao zhiguan: “中道正觀……若住此觀，則定慧力等，了了見佛性” (“the correct contemplation of the middle way … if one abides in this contemplation, the powers of concentration and wisdom are equal, and one sees the Buddha-nature clearly”) (E-29); the Fahua xuanyi: “唯佛與佛乃能究盡諸法實相” (“only a Buddha together with a Buddha can fully exhaust the real mark of all dharmas”) (E-27). The scope of application of the six identities: “圓觀諸法，皆云「六即」” (“when all dharmas are contemplated perfectly, all are spoken of as the ‘six identities’”) (E-42). In addition, as non-load-bearing side evidence of doubtful attribution, the T2 Guanyin xuanyi: “佛雖不斷性惡，而能達於惡” (“although the Buddha does not cut off inherent evil, he can penetrate evil”) (E-34).

Judgment and breaking point: remove the cognitive completion from verbal identity to ultimate identity while keeping identity in principle, and the first layer remains complete;

but Zhiyi’s account of becoming a Buddha is made up precisely of this series of specific functions: the “knowing” of verbal identity, the “心觀明了，理慧相應” (“clear contemplation of the mind, correspondence of principle and wisdom”) of identity in contemplative practice, the “見佛性” (“seeing the Buddha-nature”) of identity of partial realization, and the “智光圓滿” (“the light of wisdom perfectly full”) of ultimate identity. Remove them, and the poor man remains forever “家有寶藏而無知者” (“having a treasure in his house without anyone knowing it”); “inherent presence in identity in principle” cannot take the place of these functions in the account. The basis for ② lies in the positive specification of these functions, not only in the warning that “one who has not realized may not claim to have realized”: taken alone, the latter is only a requirement of ordinary positions of practice, and is not sufficient to constitute a cognitive mediation in the sense of v1.3. The “necessity” here is not that which makes the real mark exist (identity in principle is inherently present), nor the addition of an objectifying cognition (“seeking the mind by the four propositions, it cannot be found” has already dismantled grasping at the three thousand), but the actual completion of the same inherently present wisdom from “not knowing in daily use” to “the light of wisdom perfectly full”. This is a B-grade structural inference running through several of Zhiyi’s lecture records;

its direct textual basis (E-15, E-16, E-17, E-42) is explicit, but “these functions cannot be deleted” is a structural interpretation, not a proposition of the original text.

The establishment and application of the six identities: the establishment of the six identities is itself directly related to the question of the deletion test. “約六即顯是者，為初心是，後心是？” (“showing what is right by the six identities: is it the initial mind that is right, or the later mind?”) — this question is precisely the question “if the ground is inherently present, can completion be deleted?”; Zhiyi’s answer is “非初不離初，非後不離後” (“not the initial, yet not apart from the initial; not the later, yet not apart from the later”): both the initial and the later mind are right, and yet the initial mind cannot take the place of the later; without faith one pushes the holy realm far off, without wisdom one says one is equal to the Buddha, and “初後俱非” (“beginning and end are both wrong”). The six identities are moreover stated explicitly to be the framework of perfect contemplation itself: “圓觀諸法，皆云「六即」。故以圓意約一切法，悉用六即判位” (“when all dharmas are contemplated perfectly, all are spoken of as the ‘six identities’;

therefore, with the perfect intent, the six identities are used to determine the positions of all dharmas”) (E-42), and they are the last step from “sifting out what is wrong” to “showing what is right” (“次約六即位，展轉深細，方乃顯是” — “then in terms of the positions of the six identities, becoming ever deeper and finer, and only then is what is right shown”). The six identities are therefore not a sequence imposed by researchers from outside the perfect-and-sudden.

Independence of the evidence and its limits: E-12—E-19 all come from the Mohe zhiguan, E-27 and E-41 from the Fahua xuanyi, E-29 from the Xiao zhiguan — they are statements by the same author in different lecture records; among them the Mohe zhiguan is Guanding’s revised recension, and all T1 carries a recording layer. E-33 and E-34 come from the Guanyin xuanyi, whose attribution is debated; they are non-load-bearing side evidence, and deleting them does not affect the main category. E-41 is side evidence of consistency across lecture records and does not alone raise the grade. Zhiyi’s deathbed statement about the five grades, E-03, is T4 and serves only as background. B does not rest on the quantity of evidence, but on whether the relation “inherent presence in identity in principle — not knowing in daily use — contemplative practice — seeing the Buddha-nature — the light of wisdom perfectly full” remains consistent across Zhiyi’s different lecture records.

Systematic positive evidence for the ① direction and the deletion test: E-07 the chapter on the perfect-and-sudden, “no path to cultivate, no cessation to realize”, E-10 no need to abandon the ordinary and turn toward the holy, E-14 identity in principle, E-21 three thousand in one thought, E-26 three without difference, and “returning to the great abode” E-39, E-40 form a real chain of evidence running through the ground, cognition, and delusion and awakening — by no means isolated sentences (E-33, the inherent inclusion of good and evil, is T2 non-load-bearing side evidence). The strongest version of ① is not “the ground holds, so there is no need to practise”, but: practice and realization, though they really take place, are simply the functioning of the ground; contemplation is non-dual with the real mark, and the completion between identity in principle and ultimate identity is only an inseparable mode of the ground’s manifestation, not an independent load-bearing function in the sense of v1.3. This archive accepts that contemplation is not outside the ground. But here two questions must be kept apart: first, does contemplation set up another ground outside the real mark? Zhiyi’s many statements of “identity” answer: no (supporting ①).

Second, can those who have never contemplated, never broken through the obstructions and never realized be directly equated with ultimate identity? The six identities answer: no — “若無智，起增上慢，謂己均佛，初後俱非” (“without wisdom, one gives rise to overweening pride, says one is equal to the Buddha, and beginning and end are both wrong”) (E-12), “必須心觀明了，理慧相應” (“the mind’s contemplation must be clear, and principle and wisdom must correspond”) (E-16), “欲免上慢，當聞六即” (“if one wishes to escape pride, one should hear the six identities”) (E-41). This answer proves only that the six identities retain a real distinction of positions; it is the ② direction, but not yet a function that cannot be deleted. The two do not contradict each other. Hence each side has something to explain: ① must explain why practice and realization, though they really take place, do not constitute the independent load-bearing function the deletion test refers to; ② must explain why this occurrence, though not external to the ground, still meets the deletion test. This archive’s explanation for ② is: Zhiyi specifies continuously the concrete functions of this process — “not knowing in daily use”, “clear contemplation of the mind, correspondence of principle and wisdom”, “the light of wisdom perfectly full” (E-15, E-16, E-17) — and says explicitly that the six identities are used in contemplating all dharmas perfectly (E-42);

these functions cannot be replaced, in his account of becoming a Buddha, by “inherent presence in identity in principle”. This is a B-grade structural inference, not an A-grade proposition of the original text; the competing interpretation of ① has systematic positive evidence at the ontological level and is kept as C.

Two-directional material at the endpoint layer (returning to the great abode): the fifth summary point of the first chapter, “returning to the great abode”, is the lecture in the extant main text of the Mohe zhiguan that comes closest to the endpoint of the whole work. It first establishes “三德非新非故，而新而故” (“the three virtues are neither new nor old, and yet new and yet old”): the three obstructions are the three virtues, so the three obstructions are not old and the three virtues not new (the ① direction); “非新而新，則有發心所得之三德，乃至究竟所得之三德；非故而故，則有發心所治之三障，乃至究竟所治之三障” (“not new and yet new: so there are the three virtues attained on arousing the mind, up to the three virtues attained at the ultimate; not old and yet old: so there are the three obstructions treated on arousing the mind, up to the three obstructions treated at the ultimate”) (the ② direction); it concludes with “非新、非故、而新而故，無一異相” (“not new, not old, and yet new and yet old, with no sign of being one or different”) (E-39).

The specific explanation gives three pairs as examples — ignorance and illumination, grasping at marks and the markless, not-knowing and knowing — concluding with “無知即知，知即無知，何新何故” (“not-knowing is knowing, knowing is not-knowing — what is new, what is old?”), and then sums up “若達總別，新故無一異相” (“if one penetrates the general and the specific, new and old have no sign of being one or different”) (E-40). “What is new, what is old?” is not the only conclusion of the whole passage, nor does it unilaterally cancel “yet new and yet old”; “new and old have no sign of being one or different” does not mean the difference between new and old is wholly meaningless. This archive judges the two passages a two-directional C at the ① / ② boundary: neither ① nor ② can swallow the other on the strength of this passage alone. They add no weight to ②; ② (B) is still carried by the six identities and by “必須心觀明了、理慧相應” (“the mind’s contemplation must be clear, principle and wisdom must correspond”).

What has been withdrawn or de-reified: the objectifying relations of the mind producing dharmas and the mind containing dharmas (E-22); the self-nature of the three thousand dharmas (E-23); a holy realm sought apart from the ordinary (E-10); knowledge of the Buddha-dharma that stops at words (E-16, E-30); the overweening pride that substitutes the initial mind for the later mind (E-12);

pushing identity in principle out of reach as a remote holy realm (E-12, doubt and timidity); taking gradual dhyāna as the only path (E-06, E-35, absorbed into the three kinds of calming and contemplation).

Last load-bearing point: a single thought is the principle of the tathāgatagarbha, as soon as there is the slightest mind it contains the three thousand, the ordinary dharmas are themselves the real dharma — these are Zhiyi’s strongest specifications of the ground; but in the main text of the Mohe zhiguan Zhiyi uses the six identities to specify continuously the functions of contemplation and realization between identity in principle and ultimate identity — “not knowing in daily use”, “必須心觀明了，理慧相應” (“the mind’s contemplation must be clear, and principle and wisdom must correspond”), “智光圓滿” (“the light of wisdom perfectly full”) — states explicitly that the six identities are used in contemplating all dharmas perfectly, and calls the confusion of the two overweening pride; this cognitive completion on the side of the practitioner, which cannot be replaced by “inherent presence in identity in principle”, is the last load-bearing point (②, B, a structural inference). The ① direction is systematic positive evidence, not local rhetoric; this archive records it separately from the strength of the final classification: ② (B), with the key competing interpretation of ① at C.

mind and dharmas are “非識所識，非言所言” (“not cognized by consciousness, not spoken by words”) (E-22). (2) Toward intellectual understanding: hearing the name and speaking it is like a worm eating wood that by chance forms a character (E-16); fabricating empty words is like a poor man counting another’s treasure (E-30). These two are explicit statements of the T1 main text (A). (3) There is also a biographical record: Guanding’s Biezhuan records Zhiyi’s deathbed statement, “只是五品位耳” (“I am only at the position of the five grades”) (E-03). That “the biography has this record” can be verified as A; but taking it as Zhiyi’s own historical self-positioning, not claiming the ultimate, is only T4 background and takes no part in the main argument.

Positive evidence of self-inclusion: Zhiyi places cognition itself within the ground: any single thought is the principle of the tathāgatagarbha and contains the three wisdoms (E-14); as soon as there is the slightest mind it contains the three thousand, the Buddha-realm included (E-21); the mind, the Buddha and sentient beings are without difference (E-26); the dharma of ignorance, together with dharma-nature, gives rise to all dharmas (E-24). There is also T2 side evidence of doubtful attribution: the inherent inclusion of good and evil, even the possibility of delusion lying within the nature (E-33); deleting it does not affect the conclusion of this section.

the Guanyin xuanyi, of doubtful attribution, goes further and says that the Buddha does not cut off inherent evil (E-33, T2 side evidence); and the chapter on the perfect-and-sudden reported by Guanding further says there is no path to cultivate and no cessation to realize (E-07). Every position among the six identities is called “identity”. If identity in principle already “is” the Buddha, is the difference between ultimate identity and identity in principle only a difference of names — and, by v1.3, if cognitive completion can be deleted, does ① hold?

Why it looks like ①:

(1) The layer of the ground: a single thought is the principle of the tathāgatagarbha (E-14); dharma-nature and all dharmas are not two and not different (E-10); the treasure is already present (E-18).

(2) The self-inclusion of cognition: as soon as there is the slightest mind it contains the three thousand (E-21); the mind, the Buddha and sentient beings are without difference (E-26); the dharma of ignorance together with dharma-nature (E-24).

(3) The perfect-and-sudden: no path to cultivate, no cessation to realize, purely the one real mark (E-07, T2); saṃsāra is the dharma-body (E-09, T2).

(4) Inherent inclusion: the Buddha does not cut off inherent evil (E-33, T2; non-load-bearing side evidence of doubtful attribution).

(5) The “identity” of the six identities: all six positions are non-dual with the Buddha (E-13).

(6) Returning to the great abode: the three obstructions are the three virtues, the three virtues are not new; not-knowing is knowing, “何新何故” (“what is new, what is old?”) (E-39, E-40).

Taken together, these six layers form a complete candidate for the ① direction in Zhiyi’s works, and must be taken seriously.

Why it is still ②:

(1) The six identities’ continuous specification of functions on the side of the practitioner: between identity in principle and verbal identity lies the boundary of “日用不知” (“not knowing in daily use”) (E-15); between verbal identity and identity in contemplative practice lies the requirement “必須心觀明了，理慧相應” (“the mind’s contemplation must be clear, and principle and wisdom must correspond”) (E-16); ultimate identity is specified by “智光圓滿” (“the light of wisdom perfectly full”) (E-17). “Identity” guarantees non-duality, and “beginning with the ordinary and ending with the holy” guarantees difference (E-13).

The six identities are not an expedient outside the perfect-and-sudden: “圓觀諸法，皆云「六即」” (“when all dharmas are contemplated perfectly, all are spoken of as the ‘six identities’”) (E-42).

(2) Zhiyi also states explicitly the reason for establishing the six identities: to prevent the overweening pride of “謂己均佛” (“saying one is equal to the Buddha”), “初後俱非” (“beginning and end are both wrong”) (E-12). Taken alone, this warning is only a requirement of ordinary positions; only read together with the functional specifications of (1) does it form a limit on the ① reading.

(3) The “no path to cultivate” of the chapter on the perfect-and-sudden (T2) is immediately followed by hearing, faith, practice and position (E-08); the “no need to abandon the ordinary and turn toward the holy” of the uncreated four truths is the content of arousing the mind of bodhi (E-10); three thousand in one thought is what is contemplated in contemplating the inconceivable realm (E-21). The strongest sentences of the ① direction all appear in the context of practice.

(4) The extreme expression of the inherent inclusion of good and evil is immediately followed by placing the difference between the Buddha and the icchantika on “penetration” (E-34, T2; non-load-bearing side evidence of doubtful attribution; deleting it does not affect the conclusion).

(5) The deletion test: it does not delete the name “ultimate identity” while keeping the inherent presence of identity in principle; it deletes the cognitive completion from “not knowing in daily use” to “the light of wisdom perfectly full” while keeping the ground. Then the poor man is forever “無知者” (“one who does not know”), and “謂己均佛” (“saying one is equal to the Buddha”) becomes the only conclusion — precisely the overweening pride Zhiyi names. The strongest version of ① can say that practice and realization, though they really take place, are simply the functioning of the ground, and contemplation is not external; this archive accepts that, but “not external” does not mean “deletable”: Zhiyi’s account of becoming a Buddha is made up of the specific functions “not knowing in daily use — clear contemplation of the mind — the light of wisdom perfectly full” (E-15, E-16, E-17), and these functions cannot be replaced by “inherent presence in identity in principle”. The Fahua xuanyi’s “欲免上慢，當聞六即” (“if one wishes to escape pride, one should hear the six identities”) (E-41) is side evidence across lecture records.

(6) The passage on returning to the great abode is itself two-directional: “neither new nor old” and “yet new and yet old” stand side by side, and “what is new, what is old?” is still followed by “若達總別，新故無一異相” (“if one penetrates the general and the specific, new and old have no sign of being one or different”) (E-39, E-40).

It cannot alone prove ①, and it adds no weight to ②.

Boundaries of source level and terminology: the “chapter on the perfect-and-sudden” comes from Guanding’s preface (T2) and cannot be treated as the main text of Zhiyi’s lectures; the doctrine of “inherent evil” comes from the Guanyin xuanyi, whose attribution is debated (T2); “three thousand in one thought” appears only once, in fascicle 5 of the Mohe zhiguan, as the content of contemplating the inconceivable realm; “identity” in the six identities means non-duality with the Buddha, not that the position has been reached.

Grades: A grade belongs to the sentences in which the text says directly “若無智，起增上慢，謂己均佛，初後俱非。為此事故，須知六即” (“without wisdom, one gives rise to overweening pride, says one is equal to the Buddha, and beginning and end are both wrong; for this reason one must know the six identities”), “理雖即是，日用不知” (“though the principle is so, one uses it daily without knowing it”), “智光圓滿不復可增，名菩提果” (“the light of wisdom perfectly full, admitting no further increase, is called the fruit of bodhi”), “即凡法是實法，不須捨凡向聖” (“the ordinary dharmas are themselves the real dharma; there is no need to abandon the ordinary and turn toward the holy”), “介爾有心，即具三千” (“as soon as there is the slightest mind, it contains the three thousand”);

B grade belongs to the judgment, running through several of Zhiyi’s lecture records, that the functions of contemplation, wisdom and realization from identity in principle to ultimate identity cannot be replaced by inherent presence in identity in principle. The strongest form of the competing reading is: practice and realization, though they really take place, are simply the functioning of the ground; contemplation is not outside the real mark, and the difference between identity in principle and ultimate identity is only a difference of depth in the same functioning of the ground — this reading has systematic positive grounds at the ontological level and is kept as C; but it must explain why the six identities’ functional specifications of “not knowing in daily use”, “clear contemplation of the mind” and “the light of wisdom perfectly full” do not constitute an independent load-bearing function. The passage on “returning to the great abode” is judged a two-directional C at the ① / ② boundary.

Conditions for reopening: if it can be positively shown from Zhiyi’s own lecture records that the six identities are only an expedient set up for those of dull faculties, and that the “no path to cultivate, no cessation to realize” of the chapter on the perfect-and-sudden is Zhiyi’s own ultimate meaning; or if reliable research shows that the passage on the six identities in the Mohe zhiguan was added by Guanding in his revision;

The primary load-bearers are E-15, E-16, E-17 and E-42 of the Mohe zhiguan; E-12 states the rationale; next come E-11, E-18, E-19 and E-29 of the Xiao zhiguan; E-41 of the Fahua xuanyi is side evidence in the same direction across lecture records and does not alone raise the grade; E-34 of the Guanyin xuanyi is non-load-bearing side evidence of doubtful attribution, and deleting it does not affect the conclusion. “Returning to the great abode”, E-39 and E-40, is judged a two-directional C and is not counted among the load-bearers of ②.

Why not yet ①: ① must positively show that everything, including cognition and one’s own speaking, lies within the occurrence of the ground, and that completion does not depend on a cognitive event that must separately take place. Zhiyi’s material on self-inclusion meets the first half — any single thought inherently contains the three thousand and is the principle of the tathāgatagarbha; the second half has not been demonstrated — Zhiyi says explicitly “though the principle is so, one uses it daily without knowing it”, and specifies completion by “clear contemplation of the mind” and “the light of wisdom perfectly full”. The strongest version of ①, “practice and realization, though they really take place, are simply the functioning of the ground”, proves that contemplation is not outside the ground;

it must still explain why these specific functions do not constitute the load-bearing function the deletion test refers to, and the present texts do not provide that explanation.

Why not ③: Zhiyi is not asking whether the ground exists or how it is possible; he specifies the ground directly (the real mark, the principle of the tathāgatagarbha, three thousand in one thought), and gives the sequence of completion of the six identities.

Why not ④: Zhiyi’s explanation of the differences among things and of the teachings is extremely systematic — the ten dharma-realms, the ten suchnesses, the three worlds, the four teachings and five periods — and could easily be seen as “explaining the world”. But all of it is gathered into “contemplating the mind as the inconceivable realm”, as what is contemplated by the ten modes of contemplation (E-20, E-21), and grasping at it is dismantled by “seeking the mind by the four propositions, it cannot be found” (E-23). Explanation is a ladder toward direct seeing, not the final position.

Relation to traditional classification: historically Zhiyi is revered as the actual founder of the Tiantai school (after Huiwen and Huisi);

• In the ten gates of nature-arising in fascicle 16 of Fazang’s Tanxuan ji: the gate of distinguishing characteristics divides three natures and three arisings — of principle, practice and fruit — with the arising of principle by “了因顯” (“manifestation through the revealing cause”) and the arising of practice “由待聞熏資發生” (“arising through dependence on the support of hearing and perfuming”), and says “今此文中，正辨後一兼辨前二” (“in this text the last is mainly discussed, and the first two together with it”), that is, the chapter mainly treats the arising of the fruit-nature (the Buddha-fruit’s responsive functioning), together with the revealing of principle and the accomplishment of practice; the gate of support says “此約菩薩位，以凡位有性而無起故” (“this is in terms of the bodhisattva position, because in the ordinary position there is nature without arising”), restricted to the bodhisattva position of “行證理成” (“practice realizing, principle accomplished”); the gate of defining meaning says “起無餘起，還以性為起” (“the arising has no other arising; it takes the nature itself as arising”), excluding a second arising apart from the nature; the gate of the virtue of the nature says “藉修引至成位” (“led by cultivation to the accomplished position”);

• the gate of the universal and the restricted, answering the question “性起唯據佛果，何故眾生心中亦爾” (“if nature-arising refers only to the Buddha-fruit, why is it so in the minds of sentient beings too?”), says: “此圓教中，盧舍那果法該眾生界，是故眾生身中亦有果相。若不爾者，則但是性而無起義，非此品說” (“in this perfect teaching the fruit-dharma of Vairocana encompasses the realm of sentient beings, so that in the bodies of sentient beings there are also marks of the fruit; were it not so, there would be only nature without the meaning of arising, which is not what this chapter says”), and declares “以明性起唯果法故，但以果中具三世間，是故眾生亦此所攝” (“because nature-arising is made clear as only the fruit-dharma, and the fruit contains the three worlds, sentient beings are also included in it”). Zhiyi on the one hand says that a single thought is the principle of the tathāgatagarbha, that as soon as there is the slightest mind it contains the three thousand, and that the three obstructions are the three virtues; on the other hand he uses the six identities to specify continuously the functions “not knowing in daily use — clear contemplation of the mind — the light of wisdom perfectly full”, and says explicitly that the six identities are used in contemplating all dharmas perfectly (E-42).

• To take “the six identities are more one-directional” or “whether the question of confusing identity in principle with the ultimate is raised explicitly” as the standard of comparison would favour the terminology of the six identities that Zhiyi uses; this archive does not adopt them. Same-scale comparison should proceed by common questions that presuppose no terminology: (a) what is the evidence that the ground holds without waiting on practice and realization, and how much can the strongest interpretation of ① explain? (b) if the role of the practitioner’s hearing, contemplating, cultivating, breaking and realizing is deleted, can the accomplishment or nature-arising the text speaks of still be fully explained? (c) can the relation of non-duality and functioning explain the “necessary occurrence” of (b) as internal to the ground rather than an additional mediation, and what explicit textual limits does each side have? (d) assess separately the explicitness of the original texts, whether the competing reading is equally reasonable, and whether the recording and editorial layers are independent. The difference that can be provisionally observed is: Fazang’s senses and scopes of “arising” are highly stratified by principle, practice and fruit and by levels of teaching; the marks of the fruit in sentient beings in the gate of the universal and the restricted are spoken from the side of the Buddha-fruit’s encompassing the three worlds;

• “the arising of accomplished practice” and “the arising of the fruit’s function” are each specified in different gates; Zhiyi, within perfect contemplation, continuously delimits the practitioner’s contemplation and realization through the six identities. The above distinction has been put through the same-scale comparison on questions (a)—(d), on the basis of the No.11 archive, this archive and the original texts of both figures: No.11 remains ② (C), and No.12 remains ② (B). The B / C difference depends on the continuity of the functional specification of completion on the side of the practitioner, on the senses and scopes of application, and on the strength of the competing interpretations, not on the term “six identities”; No.11’s gate of the universal and the restricted, with its following text “果中具三世間” (“the fruit contains the three worlds”), had already been taken into that archive’s C-grade judgment. This difference is one of interpretive strength, not of the stature of the persons, and does not exclude reassessment triggered by new original-text evidence in the future. This comparison serves only to test consistency of scale and takes no part in proving the placement of No.12.
• No.10 Vasubandhu (② [B]): Vasubandhu distinguishes “being the nature of consciousness-only” from “abiding in the nature of consciousness-only”, Zhiyi distinguishes “identity in principle” from “ultimate identity”;

• the two structures are parallel. Zhiyi’s self-inclusion is given as “a single thought contains the three thousand”, closer to present cognition than Vasubandhu’s “the nature of consciousness-only is suchness”.
• No.08 Huangbo Xiyun (② [C]): Huangbo’s local C comes from whether “no-mind” retains a cognitive function of entry; Zhiyi explicitly institutionalizes cognitive completion through the six identities. The points of dispute in the two archives differ, and Zhiyi’s six identities may not be used to reinterpret Huangbo.
• No.05 Xinxin ming (②; local C at the ① / ② boundary): the Xinxin ming sets up no positions; Zhiyi, through the six identities, affirms both non-duality and positions.
• No.073 Wenzi, Zai and Sheng (①, direction of the completed archive): the thought of Zai–Sheng, through the whole structure of Zai and Sheng, positively places cognition, writing, language and all things within being and occurrence, and explains by “认亦在中” (“recognition, too, is within”) that recognition itself is also an occurrence; Zhiyi’s corresponding material is “介爾有心即具三千” (“as soon as there is the slightest mind, it contains the three thousand”) and “即凡法是實法” (“the ordinary dharmas are themselves the real dharma”).

the chapter on the perfect-and-sudden reported by Guanding goes further, saying “無道可修，無滅可證” (“there is no path to cultivate and no cessation to realize”), and “returning to the great abode” in the Mohe zhiguan further says “三障即三德” (“the three obstructions are the three virtues”) and “無知即知，知即無知，何新何故” (“not-knowing is knowing, knowing is not-knowing — what is new, what is old?”) — these provide real, systematic positive evidence for the ① direction (the doctrine of inherent evil in the Guanyin xuanyi, whose attribution is debated, serves only as non-load-bearing side evidence). On the other hand, in the main text of the Mohe zhiguan Zhiyi uses the six identities to specify continuously contemplation and realization from identity in principle to ultimate identity — “理雖即是，日用不知” (“though the principle is so, one uses it daily without knowing it”), “必須心觀明了，理慧相應” (“the mind’s contemplation must be clear, and principle and wisdom must correspond”), “智光圓滿不復可增” (“the light of wisdom perfectly full, admitting no further increase”) — states explicitly “圓觀諸法，皆云「六即」” (“when all dharmas are contemplated perfectly, all are spoken of as the ‘six identities’”), takes “謂己均佛” (“saying one is equal to the Buddha”) as overweening pride, and uses the parable of the poor man’s treasure to show that the treasure is already present, yet must be known, dug out, opened and used.

Classified as ② “Direct Seeing of the Ground” (B), with its strength coming from the six identities’ continuous specification, in the main text of Zhiyi’s lectures, of the practitioner’s functions of contemplation, wisdom and realization and from their application to perfect contemplation — not from the quantity of evidence, nor only from the warning that “one who has not realized may not claim to have realized”; “these functions cannot be deleted” is a B-grade structural inference. Of the strongest version of ①, “practice and realization, though they really take place, are simply the functioning of the ground”, this archive accepts the part that “contemplation is not outside the ground”, but it must still explain why these functions do not constitute the load-bearing function the deletion test refers to. The passage on “returning to the great abode” in the Mohe zhiguan, “三德非新非故，而新而故……無一異相” (“the three virtues are neither new nor old, and yet new and yet old … with no sign of being one or different”), is itself two-directional, judged C at the ① / ② boundary, and adds no weight to ②. The competing interpretation in the ① direction has systematic positive evidence and is kept as C; the B / C difference from No.11 Fazang has undergone same-scale paired comparison, and No.11 remains ② (C);

• Miaofa lianhua jing xuanyi: spoken by Zhiyi, recorded by Guanding (T33 no.1716). At its head are Guanding’s “Private Record of the Origins of the Lotus” and “Private Preface”; the main text headed “spoken by the Great Master Zhizhe of Tiantai” begins at 681c28; E-26, E-27 and E-41 cited in this archive all lie within the main text. The Taishō edition has very few variant notes in this fascicle, and none in the passages cited.
• Xiuxi zhiguan zuochan fayao: stated by Zhiyi (T46 no.1915), preceded by a preface by Yuanzhao of the Song. The Taishō edition takes the edition printed in the tenth year of Wanli as base, collated with a Tokugawa-period printed edition.
• Liu miao famen: spoken by Zhiyi (T46 no.1917). Shi chan boluomi cidi famen: spoken by Zhiyi, recorded by Fashen, edited by Guanding (T46 no.1916), early lectures at Waguan Monastery. Sijiao yi: composed by Zhiyi (T46 no.1929).
• Guanyin xuanyi: headed as spoken by Zhiyi and recorded by Guanding (T34 no.1726). Its authorship is debated in modern scholarship; this archive lists it as T2.
• Zhiguan fuxing chuan hongjue: stated by Zhanran of the Tang (T46 no.1912), used only for textual history.
• Sūtras: Kumārajīva’s translation of the Miaofa lianhua jing (T09 no.262);